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CRIMINALIZING COERCIVE CONTROL 
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS 
ERIN SHELEY† 
ABSTRACT 
The sociological literature on domestic abuse shows that it is more 
complex than a series of physical assaults. Abusers use “coercive 
control” to subjugate their partners through a web of threats, 
humiliation, isolation, and demands. The presence of coercive control is 
highly predictive of future physical violence and is, in and of itself, also 
a violation of the victim’s liberty and dignity. In response to these new 
understandings the United Kingdom has recently criminalized 
nonviolent coercive control, making it illegal to, on two or more 
occasions, cause “serious alarm or distress” to an intimate partner that 
has a “substantial effect” on their “day-to-day activities.” Such a vaguely 
drafted criminal statute would raise insurmountable due process 
problems under the U.S. Constitution.  
Should the states wish to address the gravity of the harms of coercive 
control, however, this Article proposes an alternative statutory 
approach. It argues that a state legislature could combine the due process 
limits of traditionally enterprise-related offenses such as fraud and 
conspiracy with the goals of domestic abuse prevention to create a new 
offense based upon the fraud-like nature of coercively controlling 
behavior. It argues that the most useful legal framework for defining 
coercive control is similar to that of common law fraud, and that 
legislatures should adapt the scienter requirements of fraud to the actus 
reus of coercive control. In so doing, this Article also argues that it is 
risky for legislatures to punish gender-correlated offenses with 
specialized legal solutions, rather than recognizing the interrelationship 
between such offenses and other well-established crimes. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In 2010, British mother Sally Challen killed her husband Richard 
with a hammer.1 After a trial in which the prosecution depicted her as 
a jealous wife, angry over his extramarital affairs, Sally was convicted 
of murder.2 But the couple’s son David had an entirely different 
perspective on their marriage. Richard, David said, “bullied and 
humiliated” Sally, “isolated her from her friends and family, controlled 
who she could socialise with, controlled her money, restricted her 
movement and created a culture of fear and dependency.”3 Richard 
convinced Sally that the abuse she was suffering was normal.4 
Furthermore, while tightly restricting his wife’s behavior, Richard had 
repeated affairs, visited brothels, and, when Sally challenged him, “he 
would gaslight her, make her question her sanity” and tell the couple’s 
children she was “mad.”5 
Eventually, a judge agreed with David. After Sally had served 
eight years of her murder sentence, a court quashed her conviction on 
the grounds that at the time of the offense Sally was suffering from a 
psychological “adjustment disorder” brought on by the forty years of 
mental abuse and control Richard had inflicted on her.6 She pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to time served.7 
Sally’s release coincides with a moment of intense British legal and 
cultural attention to the form of interpersonal abuse known as 
“coercive control.” Popularized by American forensic social worker 
Evan Stark, the term “coercive control” refers to a pattern of abusive 
behavior perpetrated against intimate partners through threats, rage, 
orders, and demands to gradually strip away their autonomy, isolate 
 
 1. Ciara Nugent, ‘Abuse Is a Pattern.’ Why These Nations Took the Lead in Criminalizing 
Controlling Behavior in Relationships, TIME (June 21, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://time.com5610016/
coercive-control-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/5MNF-5YT4].  
 2. Id.  
 3. David Challen, My Mother, Sally Challen, Was Branded a Cold-Blooded Killer. At Last She 
Has Justice, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2019, 11:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jun/
08/my-mother-sally-challen-killed-my-father-finally-justice [https://perma.cc/2VPM-AEVM].  
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Nugent, supra note 1 (citing the cause of Challen’s “adjustment disorder” as “decades 
of coercive control by her husband”). 
 7. See id. 
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them from systems of social support, and microregulate the day-to-day 
affairs of their lives.8  
Stark, who testified on Sally Challen’s behalf, argues that the 
effort made in the 1990s by social workers, advocates, lawyers, and 
legislatures to recognize domestic violence as a crime, as opposed to 
merely a personal matter, missed part of the point.9 “From the first 
woman we had in our [Connecticut] shelter, they were telling us 
violence wasn’t the worst part,” Stark told Time magazine, “but all we 
could think to say [in order to obtain restraining orders] was ‘Tell 
people about the violence’ . . . . It took us 30 years to realize there was 
another way.”10 Thus, he argues, the now-widely recognized 
phenomenon of Battered Woman Syndrome only tells part of the story. 
Domestic abuse may, in fact, be more like kidnapping or indentured 
 
 8. See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN 
PERSONAL LIFE 5 (2007) (“Like hostages, victims of coercive control are frequently deprived of 
money, food, access to communication or transportation, and other survival resources even as 
they are cut off from family, friends, and other supports.”).  Stark’s field-creating study focuses 
on male-on-female abuse, and this Article will sometimes refer to abusers and the abused in those 
gendered terms because of the available underlying sociological literature and the fact that 
available evidence suggests women are more likely than men to be victims of domestic abuse. See 
JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NONFATAL DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, 2003–2012, at 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P2DV-3XTC] (suggesting that 76 percent of domestic violence is committed against 
women). However, it is important to remember that not only does female-on-male domestic 
violence occur, it may in fact be underreported. Rob Whitley, Domestic Violence Against Men: 
No Laughing Matter, PSYCH. TODAY (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
talking-about-men/201911/domestic-violence-against-men-no-laughing-matter [https://perma.cc/
58NS-5NAM] (collecting international data suggesting that domestic violence against men is far 
more widespread than the reported cases suggest). Furthermore, evidence suggests that LGBTQ-
identifying people are even more likely to be the victims of domestic violence than straight-
identifying people: the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has found that 
from a sample of 16,000 U.S. adults, 26 percent of homosexual men, 37.3 percent of bisexual men, 
and 29 percent of heterosexual men had been a victim of interpersonal violence, compared to 43.8 
percent of lesbian women, 61.1 percent of bisexual women and 35 percent of heterosexual 
women. MIKEL L. WALTERS, JIERU CHEN & MATTHEW J. BREIDING, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY 1–2 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RPC4-66BF]. Finally, 54 percent of trans-identifying people report experiencing 
intimate partner abuse, including physical harm and coercive control. NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 13 (2017), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/Executive%
20Summary%20-%20FINAL%201.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YDV-AML8]. Thus, the ideas 
developed in this Article are intended to apply to all abusive relationships between intimate 
partners, regardless of the genders and sexualities of the parties involved. 
 9. See Nugent, supra note 1. 
 10. Id.  
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servitude than assault.11 As criminal behavioralist Laura Richards puts 
it, “Abuse is a pattern, a war of attrition that wears a person down.”12  
Due in large part to the activism of researchers such as Stark and 
Richards, the Parliament of the United Kingdom has recently passed 
legislation that affirmatively criminalizes coercive control in England 
and Wales.13 The new statute aims to capture the broad patterns of 
subjugating interpersonal behavior that do not fall into the categories 
of any existing crimes of physical violence. Section 76 of the United 
Kingdom’s Serious Crime Act 2015 criminalizes causing someone to 
fear that violence will be used against them on at least two occasions 
or generating “serious alarm or distress” that has a “substantial adverse 
effect” on their “usual day-to-day activities.”14 As the director of public 
prosecutions put it at the time, coercive control 
can limit victims’ basic human rights, such as their freedom of 
movement and their independence . . . . Being subjected to repeated 
humiliation, intimidation or subordination can be as harmful as 
physical abuse, with many victims stating that trauma from 
psychological abuse had a more lasting impact than physical abuse.15 
In one of the earliest convictions under this law, Essex woman 
Natalie Curtis’s husband received two years in prison for a pattern of 
conduct that included calling her thirty to forty times a day, throwing 
her belongings into her neighbor’s yard, breaking into irrational, 
unpredictable rages, banging things on surfaces, and smashing up the 
kitchen.16 
 
 11. See STARK, supra note 8, at 5–6, 11–12, 14–15.  
 12. Nugent, supra note 1. 
 13. See Sandra Walklate, The Sally Challen Case: Landmark Ruling or More of the Same?, 
UNIV. LIVERPOOL NEWS (Mar. 5, 2019), https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2019/03/05/the-sally-
challen-case-landmark-ruling-or-more-of-the-same [https://perma.cc/462W-P8ZR] (“Sally 
Challen’s defence team, and much of the press coverage . . . have made significant play of the 
presence of this offence and its utility in cases . . . where there is evidence . . . that the defendant 
was living in a coercive and controlling relationship as mitigation for their acts of violence in 
response.”). 
 14. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK). 
 15. Owen Bowcott, Controlling or Coercive Domestic Abuse To Risk Five-Year Prison Term, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/dec/29/domestic-abuse-
law-controlling-coercive-behaviour [https://perma.cc/XFZ7-DU6Q].  
 16. See Jamie Grierson, ‘This Is Not Love’: Victim of Coercive Control Says She Saw Red 
Flags from the Start, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/
21/this-is-not-love-victim-of-coercive-control-says-she-saw-red-flags-from-start [https://perma.cc/
PGQ5-BYA4]. 
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Due to research showing that coercive control both imposes 
devastating harm on victims17 and predicts future physical violence, it 
is not surprising that some scholars of domestic abuse have called for 
American jurisdictions to address it—with a few states taking up the 
call.18 Indeed, Scotland, Ireland, and France have all adopted 
legislation similar to the U.K. statute.19 Furthermore, emerging 
evidence suggests the global COVID-19 lockdown, which has trapped 
domestic partners in their homes together for an extended part of the 
day, has led to an increase in the incidence and severity of domestic 
violence, creating an even more urgent and pressing need to address 
these escalating trends of abuse.20 Although excessive state 
interference into intimate relations carries enormous risks to liberty 
and privacy, those cannot be the sole considerations. The law’s 
longstanding emphasis on privacy allowed even physically violent 
abusers to escape prosecution until relatively recently.21 That said, any 
 
 17. This Article intentionally uses the term “victim” instead of “survivor” to describe those 
affected by coercive control because it implicates both survivors and victims who eventually die 
as a result of the abuse they experience. Indeed, the predictive nature of coercive control with 
respect to murder is one of the primary arguments for legal intervention.  
 18. Hawaii has a coercive control offense and California a statute that allows evidence of 
coercive control to be used as evidence of domestic violence in family court. See Melena Ryzik & 
Katie Benner, What Defines Domestic Abuse? Survivors Say It’s More than Assault, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/us/cori-bush-fka-twigs-coercive-control.
html [https://perma.cc/ZFU3-H82K]. New York and Connecticut have also introduced coercive 
control offenses. Id.; see also Kristy Candela, Protecting the Invisible Victim: Incorporating 
Coercive Control in Domestic Violence Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112, 112–14 (2016); Claire 
Wright, Torture at Home: Borrowing from the Torture Convention To Define Domestic Violence, 
24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 461 (2013) (making the related, though narrower, argument that 
states should adopt a definition of “domestic violence” in child custody cases that includes mental 
harm); Alexandra Michelle Ortiz, Note, Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment 
To Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 VAND. L. REV. 681, 
703 (2018) (proposing the crime of false imprisonment be expanded to include situations of 
coercive control).  
 19. Domestic Violence Act 2018 (Act No. 6 2018) (Ir.); Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 
(ASP 5); Psychological Violence a Criminal Offence in France, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2010), https://
www.bbc.com/news/10459906 [https://perma.cc/U799-GJKM] (defining psychological violence as 
“repeated acts which could be constituted by words or other machinations, to degrade one’s 
quality of life and cause a change to one’s mental or physical state”). 
 20. See, e.g., Babina Gosangi, Hyesun Park, Richard Thomas, Rahul Gujrathi, Camden P. 
Bay, Ali S. Raja, Steven E. Seltzer, Marta Chadwick Balcom, Meghan L. McDonald, Dennis P. 
Orgill, Mitchel B. Harris, Giles W. Boland, Kathryn Rexrode & Bharti Khurana, Exacerbation of 
Physical Intimate Partner Violence During COVID-19 Lockdown, RADIOLOGY 1, 4–7 (Aug. 13, 
2020), https://pubs.rsna.org/doi/pdf/10.1148/radiol.2020202866 [https://perma.cc/8ZU7-8NLD]. 
 21. See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 
332 (6th ed. 2020). 
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attempt to use the criminal law to address domestic abuse—like any 
application of the criminal law—also creates the risk of racially 
asymmetric enforcement, overincarceration, and disproportionate 
impact on communities of color.22 Criminalizing coercive control would 
therefore require, as a precondition, a substantially reformed 
enforcement and sentencing environment. 
Beyond the problems with enforcement, there are also numerous 
constitutional and legal problems attendant to criminally punishing 
someone for creating “serious alarm or distress” that has a “substantial 
effect”23 on the victim. As Professor Jonathan Turley notes, the 
ambiguity of the U.K. statutory terms “allows for a disturbing level of 
discretion of prosecutors in picking marriages and relationships 
deemed coercive” and, in cases where the victim is not physically 
prevented from leaving, “the question is how to criminalize conduct 
that can be highly subjective or interpretive.”24 Existing American 
vagueness, overbreadth, and First Amendment jurisprudence would 
seem to make this sort of effort unconstitutional. Administrability 
concerns would seem to make it, at least, unadvisable. 
This Article makes the first attempt to harmonize the goals 
motivating § 76 of the United Kingdom’s Serious Crime Act 2015 with 
principles of American criminal constitutional law. The purpose here 
is not to advocate directly for immediate legislation. To avoid doing 
more harm than good, legislation would have to accompany reforms to 
the current law enforcement response to physical domestic violence, 
which some domestic violence experts criticize as being culture-blind 
and ineffective.25 The extensive research on policing and restorative 
justice necessary to propose such a mechanism is beyond the scope of 
this Article. It does, however, make the argument that a state 
legislature could, consistent with well-established principles of criminal 
law, draft an offense that punishes the nonviolent coercive control of 
an intimate partner without resorting to the open-ended, potentially 
 
 22. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 805–07 (2007).  
 23. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK). 
 24. Jonathan Turley, English Law Allows for Five Years in Prison for Spouses Who 
Engage in “Coercive and Controlling Behavior,” JONATHAN TURLEY (Dec. 29, 2015), https://
jonathanturley.org/2015/12/29/english-law-allows-for-five-years-in-prison-for-spouses-who-
engage-in-coercive-and-controlling-behavior [https://perma.cc/7VY7-ZVED]. 
 25. See, e.g., Robert L. Hampton, Jaslean J. LaTaillade, Alicia Dacey & J.R. Marghi, 
Evaluating Domestic Violence Interventions for Black Women, 16 J. AGGRESSION 
MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 330, 330–33 (2008). 
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unconstitutional language adopted by the United Kingdom. As well, 
this Article makes the broader claim that borrowing from other areas 
of criminal law will produce a more robust and innovative solution than 
the more compartmentalized approach often taken by reformers such 
as those in the United Kingdom. 
As I have noted elsewhere, courts and scholars have largely 
developed the jurisprudential framework for corporate and 
commercial criminal law separately from the law governing bodily 
crimes, particularly gendered crimes such as sexual offenses.26 Here, I 
argue that a state legislature could integrate the due process limits to 
traditionally enterprise-related offenses, such as fraud and conspiracy, 
with the goals of domestic abuse prevention to create a new offense 
based upon the fraud-like nature of coercively controlling behavior. 
Like criminal conspiracy, coercive control seeks to transform 
individually legal—and even constitutionally protected—thoughts and 
words into crimes based on sociological evidence that the context in 
which they arise is uniquely dangerous. Like criminal fraud, coercive 
control requires legislatures and courts to decide where, across the 
spectrum of an individual’s potentially immoral behavior toward 
another party, such behavior should become criminal. In fraud, that 
line has to do with specific intent to use deceit to deprive the victim of 
something of value. That the U.K. statute fails to draw an analogous 
line is its major, though not only, failing.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I gathers the sociological 
and criminological data on coercive control to demonstrate the legally 
cognizable harms it causes and then summarizes the United Kingdom’s 
legislative solution. Part II lays out the constitutional, evidentiary, and 
policy problems with the United Kingdom’s coercive control law. Part 
III argues that we can find solutions to these problems in the 
jurisprudence of other substantive offenses that are based on 
inherently criminal speech and communicative conduct. It argues that 
a well-drafted coercive control offense should consider the 
constitutional problems and existing case law of child and elder abuse, 
stalking, false imprisonment, blackmail, conspiracy, and fraud. Part IV 
integrates these solutions into a model coercive control statute. It 
argues, perhaps counterintuitively, that the most useful criminal-law 
framework for thinking about coercive control is that of common law 
 
 26. See e.g., Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea, 
97 N.C. L. REV. 773, 802–09 (2019) (arguing that existing principles of corporate criminal liability 
logically allow for prosecution of corporations for sexual assault under certain circumstances). 
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fraud, and that an equivalent to the scienter requirement of fraud can 
and should apply to coercive control. Finally, it notes the remaining 
policy questions a legislature should grapple with before criminalizing 
coercive control. The Article concludes by arguing that it is risky for 
legislatures to create a sui generis legal remedy for harmful “gendered” 
conduct like coercive control, as opposed to harmonizing a new offense 
with other, well-established crimes. 
I.  COERCIVE CONTROL AND THE HARMS IT CAUSES 
Like the Sally Challen case did in the United Kingdom, the 
popular Dirty John podcast (and subsequent television adaptation on 
the Bravo network) introduced American audiences to the horrors of 
unchecked coercive control. In Dirty John, Los Angeles Times reporter 
Christopher Goffard tells the true story of John Meehan, a charming 
con man who uses tactics of gaslighting, isolation, and manipulation to 
slowly gain financial and physical control over his girlfriend Debra 
Newell—a situation that becomes violent when Debra finally leaves 
him and Meehan attempts to murder her daughter.27 Though these 
stories surely resonate emotionally, the underlying psychological 
dynamic of coercive control is complex and not necessarily intuitive to 
a general public. This Part will provide a more precise definition of the 
social problem being addressed by recognizing coercive control as a 
crime and a summary of the new British legal framework designed to 
confront it.  
A. Definitions of Coercive Control 
Anti–domestic violence advocates have long recognized the 
relationship between physical violence and the background conditions 
of psychological control that give rise to it. For example, the National 
Domestic Violence Hotline defines domestic violence as “a pattern of 
behaviors used by one partner to maintain power and control over 
another partner in an intimate relationship.”28 This definition explicitly 
 
 27. See Haylee Barber, ‘Coercive Control’ Potential Factor in ‘Dirty John’ Case of 
Psychological Abuse, NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:39 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/dateline/
coercive-control-potential-factor-dirty-john-case-psychological-abuse-n837361 [https://perma.cc/
8FHS-K2PQ]; Christopher Goffard, Dirty John, Part One: The Real Thing, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 
2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-dirty-john [https://perma.cc/J3KN-LDYE]. 
 28. Understand Relationship Abuse, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (May 14, 2017), 
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined [https://perma.cc/KUV4-Z88J]. 
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lacks reference to a component of physical contact, focusing instead on 
the abuser’s intent: maintaining power over another party. Stark, the 
sociologist who popularized the concept of coercive control to capture 
the systematic nature of domestic abuse, states that “the main means 
used to establish control is the microregulation of everyday behaviors 
associated with stereotypic female roles, such as how women dress, 
cook, clean, socialize, care for their children, or perform sexually.”29 
From this definition, one can see that a pattern of coercive control may 
arise from myriad routine interactions, each of which on its own may 
seem like run-of-the-mill nagging within a romantic relationship.  
British legal scholar Vanessa Bettinson, a longtime advocate of 
the new offense, summarizes the key aspects of coercive control as 
“reflecting extreme examples of accepted male behaviours such as the 
control of financial resources; the use of credible threats which may or 
may not involve threats of physical violence; a victim feeling in need of 
the dominator; damaged psychological well-being of the victim and a 
high risk of suicide.”30 The complex dynamic of coercive control 
contributes both to the harms it causes and the difficulty of capturing 
it using the traditional tools of the criminal law.31 
B. Identifying the Harms of Coercive Control 
A core function of criminal law is to redress harm.32 Retributivists 
urge that those who inflict harm on society should be punished to a 
degree morally commensurate with that harm.33 Expressivists caution 
that, should the justice system fail to punish harm, it risks sending a 
message to victims and offenders that we, as a society, morally tolerate 
those harms.34 Utilitarians care less about abstract morality and more 
 
 29. STARK, supra note 8, at 5. 
 30. Vanessa Bettinson, Aligning Partial Defences to Murder with the Offence of Coercive or 
Controlling Behaviour, 83 J. CRIM. L. 71, 74 (2019). 
 31. As discussed in supra note 8, while the sociological literature on coercive control has, up 
to this point, focused heavily on male-on-female abuse, the data on domestic violence generally 
shows that abusive relationships arise between partners of all genders and sexualities. 
 32. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2–3 (describing “public wrongs” 
as “breach[es] and violation[s] of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, 
considered as a community” and stating that they “are distinguished by the harsher appellation 
of crimes and misdemesnors [sic]”). 
 33. See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 479 (1968). 
 34. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98–100 (1970); Jean Hampton, An 
Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 19–21 (Wesley Cragg 
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about deterring future harms, therefore arguing that the law should 
only punish to the degree necessary to achieve optimal deterrence.35 
Regardless of the theory of punishment one adopts, however, it is clear 
that the legislature must identify the kind and severity of harm caused 
by a behavior before it justifiably criminalizes it.  
The question presented in the case of coercive control is, then, 
what harms result from coercive behavior, short of physical violence 
that is already criminal, between intimate parties? For most of history, 
the law deemed even physical violence between domestic partners to 
be a private matter, not harmful enough to warrant the attention of 
criminal law.36 By publicly articulating the harms of domestic violence, 
reformers in the 1970s and 1980s largely succeeded in prompting 
courts, prosecutors, and legislators to recognize it as the criminal 
battery it is.37 Many psychologists, sociologists, criminologists, and 
anti–domestic violence advocates make similar arguments today about 
the harms of coercive control. These harms fall into two general 
categories: intrinsic harms and predicted harms.  
1. Intrinsic Harms.  Physical domestic violence imposes many 
physical and psychological costs on its victims beyond the immediate 
wounds themselves: The U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) 
National Institute of Justice reports that up to 88 percent of battered 
women in shelters suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(“PTSD”).38 “[A]s many as 72 percent of abuse victims experience 
depression . . . and 75 percent experience severe anxiety.”39 And studies 
show that purely psychological violence is just as detrimental to a 
victim’s mental health as its physical counterpart.40 A long period of 
 
ed., 1992); JEFFRIE MURPHY, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 25 
(1988). 
 35. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19–22, 27–31 (London, 
Robert Heward 1830); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36, 39–
41 (1968). 
 36. See, e.g., WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 21, at 332.  
 37. Cf. id. at 332–33. 
 38. ANDREW R. KLEIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PRACTICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 30 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf [https://
perma.cc/48QP-3QQ4]. 
 39. Id. (citation omitted). 
 40. See Maria A. Pico-Alfonso, M. Isabel Garcia-Linares, Nuria Celda-Navarro, Concepción 
Blasco-Ros, Enrique Echeburúa & Manuela Martinez, The Impact of Physical, Psychological, and 
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coercive control creates “psychological trauma, making victims 
vulnerable as the trauma overrides the ability to control their lives and 
experience feelings of helplessness and terror.”41 Furthermore, 
research links both physical and psychological domestic violence to a 
range of physical harms to the victim, including disability preventing 
work, arthritis, chronic pain, migraine and other frequent headaches, 
stammering, sexually transmitted infections,, chronic pelvic pain, 
stomach ulcers, spastic colon, frequent indigestion, diarrhea, 
constipation, and suicide.42  
Beyond the empirically measurable medical impacts, a victim of 
nonviolent coercive control suffers another sort of harm in common 
with the victim of physical violence: a loss of autonomy.43 Stark defines 
coercive control as conduct intended to undermine another person’s 
autonomy, freedom, and integrity.44 Scholars of coercive control often 
refer to it, for that reason, as a “liberty crime.”45 As Professors Vanessa 
Bettinson and Charlotte Bishop put it, arguing for what would become 
§ 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, “Whereas many criminal offences 
protect individuals against ‘the reduction of options’, domestic abuse 
involves not only the options of the victim being reduced, but also the 
options that remain being subject to unwarranted and arbitrary control 
by another person.”46 Many scholars agree that nonviolent coercive 
 
Sexual Intimate Male Partner Violence on Women’s Mental Health: Depressive Symptoms, 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, State Anxiety, and Suicide, 15 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 599, 609 (2006). 
 41. Bettinson, supra note 30, at 73.  
 42. Ann L. Coker, Paige H. Smith, Lesa Bethea, Melissa R. King & Robert E. McKeown, 
Physical Health Consequences of Physical and Psychological Intimate Partner Violence, 9 
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 451, 455–56 (2000) (“We found that psychological violence was associated 
with many of the same health outcomes as was physical IPV.”). Victims of coercive control are 
also at a greater risk of suicide. See RUTH AITKEN & VANESSA E. MUNRO, DOMESTIC ABUSE 
AND SUICIDE 11 (2018), http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/103609/1/WRAP-Domestic-abuse-and-
suicide-Munro-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8SW-S8RA].  
 43. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Progress: Translating Evan Stark’s Coercive 
Control into Legal Doctrine for Abused Women, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1458, 1459–61 
(2009). 
 44. See STARK, supra note 8, at 15. 
 45. See id. at 380–82; Emma Williamson, Living in the World of the Domestic Violence 
Perpetrator: Negotiating the Unreality of Coercive Control, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1412, 
1414 (2010); see also JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF 
VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 74–75 (1992) (characterizing 
domestic violence as a relationship based in coercive control and explaining that this type of 
relationship imposes “domestic captivity” on women).  
 46. Vanessa Bettinson & Charlotte Bishop, Is the Creation of a Discrete Offence of Coercive 
Control Necessary To Combat Domestic Violence?, 66 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 179, 183 (2015). 
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control, alone or in concert with physical domestic violence, imposes a 
set of harms unique in their temporal duration and comprehensive 
scope—the purpose of coercive control is for an abuser indefinitely to 
dictate all aspects of a victim’s life.47 The case studies with which this 
Article opened all demonstrate the complexity and duration of the 
harms suffered by victims of coercive control. As Professor Deborah 
Tuerkheimer puts it, the “transactional model” of crime—in which the 
system treats a single action such as a battery as a cognizable offense—
misses the reality of domestic abuse as “an ongoing pattern of conduct 
occurring within a relationship characterized by power and control.”48 
2. Predicted Harms.  In addition to harming a victim directly 
through coercive control itself, an individual who engages in it is more 
likely to become physically violent in the future.49 A DOJ National 
Institute of Justice study found that intimate partners who exercised 
control over their partners’ daily activities were more than five times 
more likely to kill them.50 When compared with “situational” intimate 
partner violence, violence arising in coercively controlling 
 
 47. See Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: 
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 746–48 (2005); Donald G. Dutton & Susan 
Painter, Emotional Attachments in Abusive Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory, 
8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 105, 107 (1993); Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion 
on Domestic Violence Victims, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 2–3 (2007); Victor Tadros, 
The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account, 65 LA. L. REV. 989, 989–94 
(2005). 
 48. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battery: A Call To 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 960–61 (2004); see also 
Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Re-Imagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic 
Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2009) (noting the law’s inability to address 
harms of women who are not subjected to distinguishable acts of violence). 
 49. See, e.g., STARK, supra note 8, at 276 (concluding that coercive control is “the most 
dangerous” context in which women are abused); Pico-Alfonso et al., supra note 40, at 602. See 
generally Christopher M. Murphy & K. Daniel O’Leary, Psychological Aggression Predicts 
Physical Aggression in Early Marriage, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 579 (1989) 
(demonstrating that psychological aggression predicts physical aggression).  
 50. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn Rebecca Block, 
Doris Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn Sachs, Phyllis Sharps, 
Yvonne Ulrich & Susan A. Wilt, Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide, 250 NAT’L 
INST. JUST. J. 14, 17 (2003), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/jr000250e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KQ5-
LEXL]; see also Neil Websdale, Assessing Risk in Domestic Violence Cases, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 38, 40 (Nicky Ali Jackson ed., 2007) (citing “obsessive possessiveness 
or morbid jealousy” as a factor “[t]he research literature consistently identifies . . . as central to 
intimate partner homicides”); Signs of an Abusive Partner, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/signs-of-abuse [https://perma.cc/S4T2-7PH5] (identifying numerous 
nonviolent controlling behaviors as “warning signs” of violence).  
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relationships tends to be more frequent and more severe.51 In 
coercively controlling relationships, acts of severe physical, sexual, and 
emotional abuse, harassment, coercion, and control are more likely to 
continue and even escalate after partners separate because abusers 
subjectively experience separation as a loss of control.52 Furthermore, 
coercive controllers pose risks not only to their partners but to their 
children, particularly in cases of divorce. The Department of Justice of 
Canada warns that “the risk of lethal violence is particularly high 
following parental separation” and lists as a risk factor for such 
violence “[u]sing the child as a weapon . . . to continue to intimidate, 
harass, or exert control over their ex-spouse.”53  
 
 51. Nicola Graham-Kevan & John Archer, Intimate Terrorism and Common Couple 
Violence. A Test of Johnson’s Predictions in Four British Samples, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 1247, 1265 (2003) (“[C]ontrolling behaviors are a risk marker for high frequency, 
injurious, escalating physical aggression.”); Jennifer L. Hardesty, Kimberly A. Crossman, Megan 
L. Haselschwerdt, Marcela Raffaelli, Brian G. Ogolsky & Michael P. Johnson, Toward a Standard 
Approach to Operationalizing Coercive Control and Classifying Violence Types, 77 J. MARRIAGE 
FAM. 833, 839 (2015) (finding that the frequency and severity of violent acts were greater for 
mothers who experienced controlling behaviors); Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The 
Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the 
National Violence Against Women Survey, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 322, 335 (2005) (finding that women 
subjected to nonviolent controlling behaviors experienced more frequent violence); Andy Myhill, 
Measuring Coercive Control: What Can We Learn from National Population Surveys?, 21 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 355, 366 (2015) (“[R]elationships with coercive control are 
characterized by more frequent and severe violence . . . .”); Samantha K. Nielsen, Jennifer L. 
Hardesty & Marcela Raffaelli, Exploring Variations Within Situational Couple Violence and 
Comparisons With Coercive Controlling Violence and No Violence/No Control, 22 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 206, 215 (2016) (explaining that mothers who are not subjected to control 
tactics in addition to violence experienced less severe violence than mothers subjected to control 
tactics); Paige Hall Smith, Gloria E. Thornton, Robert DeVellis, Joanne Earp & Ann L. Coker, 
A Population-Based Study of the Prevalence and Distinctiveness of Battering, Physical Assault, 
and Sexual Assault in Intimate Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1208, 1216–17 (2002) 
(finding correlations among different types of violence). 
 52. See Myhill, supra note 51, at 368 (identifying separation as a risk factor for intimate 
partner violence); Petra Ornstein & Johanna Rickne, When Does Intimate Partner Violence 
Continue After Separation?, 19 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 617, 619–21 (2013).  
 53. PETER JAFFE, KATREENA SCOTT, ANGELIQUE JENNEY, MYRNA DAWSON, ANNA-LEE 
STRAATMAN & MARCIE CAMPBELL, DEP’T OF JUST. OF CAN., RISK FACTORS FOR CHILDREN IN 
SITUATIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 19 (2014), 
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/rfcsfv-freevf/rfcsfv-freevf.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KR7-
N3LJ]. Abusive partners also frequently use the divorce court system as a means of coercively 
controlling their partners once they no longer have physical access to them after a separation. See, 
e.g., Heather Douglas, Legal Systems Abuse and Coercive Control, 18 CRIM. & CRIM. JUST. 84, 85–
86 (2018); Susan L. Miller & Nicole L. Smolter, ‘Paper Abuse’: When All Else Fails, Batterers Use 
Procedural Stalking, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 637, 637–38 (2011); Brittany E. Hayes, 
Abusive Men’s Indirect Control of their Partner During the Process of Separation, 27 J. FAM. 
VIOLENCE 333, 334 (2012). 
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This particular risk of coercive control came to national attention 
in Canada after forty-one-year-old father Andrew Berry stabbed his 
four- and six-year-old little girls to death on Christmas Day 2017.54 
Berry had partial custody after a court had determined—consistent 
with the background presumptions of the governing law—that a 
husband’s controlling behavior against his wife should not affect a 
custody determination so long as he has never been violent toward the 
children themselves, because contact with a father is presumptively 
considered to be in the best interest of a child.55 Due in large part to 
the complex relationship between coercive control and physical 
violence, one can set aside the direct psychological harms caused by 
the controlling behavior and nonetheless identify the future physical 
harm to victims and their children posed by such behavior. It should 
also be noted that—as in the case of Sally Challen—coercive control 
predicts violent behavior by the abused party as well as the abuser.56 In 
her qualitative study of the transcripts of trials of women who had 
killed their batterers, Professor Elizabeth Sheehy found that coercive 
control factors are “more predictive of intimate homicide than the 
severity or frequency of . . . physical violence.”57 
C. The U.K. Legislative Response 
In the face of a growing understanding of the harms of coercive 
control, § 76 of the United Kingdom’s Serious Crime Act 2015 now 
criminalizes coercive or controlling behavior in an intimate or family 
relationship. Public support for the bill derived in part from a report 
released by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (“HMIC”), 
which highlighted the inadequacies of police response to domestic 
violence.58 The report found that, despite improvements in 
 
 54. Louise Dickson, Trial of Oak Bay Man Accused of Killing His Two Daughters Begins 
in Vancouver, TIMES-COLONIST (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.timescolonist.com/news/local/
trial-of-oak-bay-man-accused-of-killing-his-two-daughters-begins-in-vancouver-1.23793283 
[https://perma.cc/QH5E-PWLW]. 
 55. Lori Chambers, Deb Zweep & Nadia Verrelli, Paternal Filicide and Coercive Control: 
Reviewing the Evidence in Cotton v. Berry, 51 UBC L. REV. 671, 674 (2018). 
 56. See supra notes 1–7.  
 57. ELIZABETH A. SHEEHY, DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN ON TRIAL: LESSONS FROM 
THE TRANSCRIPTS 235 (2014). 
 58. HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, EVERYONE’S BUSINESS: 
IMPROVING THE POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC ABUSE 50 (2014), https://www.
justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/improving-the-police-response-
to-domestic-abuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4QT-MBZG]. 
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prosecutorial practices surrounding domestic violence itself, police 
struggled to understand the nature of coercive control, which is a 
defining feature of many domestic violence cases.59 Eventually, the 
Home Office concluded there was a gap in the existing substantive 
legal framework’s focus on isolated incidents of physical violence, 
which failed to capture the ongoing nature of domestic abuse.60  
The new § 76 states: 
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if— 
a. A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour 
towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, 
b. at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally 
connected, 
c. the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and 
d. A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a 
serious effect on B.61 
Commentators observe that the requirement that the behavior be 
“repeated” or “continuous” avoids criminalizing the benign everyday 
power struggles in intimate relationships.62 However, the statute 
provides no definition of what “controlling or coercive” means under 
subsection (1)a. Bettinson suggests that courts look to the Home 
Office’s definitions in its guidance manual on domestic violence and 
abuse, which describes “controlling” behavior as: “a range of acts 
designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating 
them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities 
for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for 
independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday 
behaviour.”63 The manual defines “coercive” behavior as “an act or 
pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other 
abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim.”64 
 
 59. Id. at 30. 
 60. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 185. 
 61. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).  
 62. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 191. 
 63. Id. at 180 (citing HOME OFF., GUIDANCE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ABUSE (2013) 
[hereinafter HOME OFF. GUIDANCE]). 
 64. Id. (citing HOME OFF. GUIDANCE, supra note 63).  
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Though other statutory terms are more precise, some raise 
additional interpretive problems. The statute elsewhere specifies that 
“personally connected” means that A and B have an “intimate” or 
“family relationship.”65 The requisite “serious effect on B” occurs 
when either “it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence 
will be used against B” or “it causes B serious alarm or distress which 
has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.”66 
Commentators note that the text of the statute does not make it clear 
whether a subjective or objective standard should be applied to the 
question of whether B experiences fear or alarm—in other words, 
whether the jury would need to find that such alarm was reasonable or 
merely honestly felt.67 Finally, the objective mens rea standard requires 
only that the defendant “knows or ought to know” that his conduct 
would cause fear or alarm,68 which precludes the defense that he did 
not intend to cause such fear. As commentators observed of the 
harassment statutes on which the mens rea element of the coercive 
control offense is based, “for the victim, the behaviour is ‘no less 
harmful because it is unintentional.’”69 
To date, U.K. enforcement of this offense has been spotty. By the 
end of 2016, 155 people had been prosecuted under the statute, but 
many of those cases involved coercive control in addition to some form 
of physical violence.70 One example of a case of purely nonviolent 
control was that of Bexhill man Paul Playle, who was convicted for 
psychological tactics such as stalking his wife online by sending 
messages to people from her online accounts, telling her that her prior 
partner was responsible, and then comforting her in her distress.71 He 
was sentenced to three years and six months in prison.72 Though the 
U.K. experience with criminalizing coercive control remains, itself, a 
work in progress, evaluating the offense as a hypothetical in the 
American legal context poses even more challenges. 
 
 65. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76(2) (UK). 
 66. Id. § 76(4). 
 67. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 194. 
 68. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76(1)(d), (5) (UK). 
 69. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 195 (citing Emily Finch, The Perfect Stalking Law: 
An Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 2002 CRIM. L. REV. 
704). 
 70. Bettinson, supra note 30, at 77–78.   
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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II.  PROBLEMS WITH CRIMINALIZING COERCIVE CONTROL 
This Part considers the problems the U.K. version of coercive 
control would create under American criminal, constitutional, and 
evidentiary laws, as well as the policy questions it would raise. 
A. Substantive Problems 
The most significant problem with a coercive control offense like 
§ 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is that it probably violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, 
it creates problems of vagueness and overbreadth and may 
impermissibly criminalize thought. 
1. Vagueness.  A statute that “either forbids or requires the doing 
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning” violates the Due Process Clauses.73 
Such a statute fails to put a person on sufficient notice of the content 
of the criminal law for him to conform his behavior to it.74 It also 
encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by the 
government and constitutes an impermissible delegation of legislative 
authority to law enforcement.75  
Several well-known Supreme Court vagueness cases have 
involved vagrancy statutes. In Kolender v. Lawson,76 the Court struck 
down a California statute requiring persons loitering on the streets to 
provide “credible and reliable” identification whenever requested by 
the police.77 The statute was unconstitutionally vague because it failed 
to define what “credible and reliable” identification meant.78 More 
recently, in Chicago v. Morales,79 the Court invalidated a Chicago 
ordinance intended to prevent “criminal street gang members” from 
loitering in public places.”80 The ordinance defined “loiter” as “to 
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose,”81 a definition that 
 
 73. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
 74. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974). 
 75. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); see also Smith, 415 U.S. at 578 (criticizing 
the unfettered latitude vague statutes give to law enforcement officials).  
 76. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
 77. Id. at 353–54. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
 80. Id. at 46–47. 
 81. Id. at 56. 
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the Court deemed unconstitutionally vague.82 The Court found that 
“the city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize each instance a 
citizen stands in public with a gang member,” and therefore “the 
vagueness that dooms [the] ordinance is not the product of uncertainty 
about the normal meaning of ‘loitering,’ but rather about what loitering 
is covered by the ordinance and what is not.”83 
The vagueness doctrine proved to be alive and well in a recent 
high-profile case: the prosecution of Jeff Skilling, former CEO of the 
Enron Corporation, for his role in his company’s famous accounting 
fraud scandal in 2003.84 The U.S. government charged Skilling with 
(among many other things) honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346 for misrepresenting Enron’s financial health by concealing the 
corporation’s losses in separate trusts off of Enron’s books. The 
government asserted that he thereby defrauded shareholders by 
profiting from their losses when he earned enormous, undeserved 
executive bonuses tied to certain quarterly earnings-per-share 
targets.85 Skilling’s vagueness challenge to his honest services fraud 
conviction turned on what it means to defraud someone of “the 
intangible right of honest services,” which the government urged the 
Court to construe as including any instance of “undisclosed self-
dealing.”86 Declining to read the offense this broadly, the Court noted 
that the “core application” of honest services fraud historically had 
consisted of cases involving specifically bribes and kickbacks.87 The 
Court thus cited the need to avoid a potential vagueness problem in 
holding that honest services fraud under § 1346 “does not encompass 
conduct more wide ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and 
kickbacks” and “resist[ed] the Government’s less constrained 
construction absent Congress’ clear instruction otherwise.”88 
These cases suggest that a coercive control statute with language 
like that adopted in the United Kingdom would likely fail to pass 
constitutional muster on vagueness grounds.89 Most notably, the U.K. 
statute’s failure to define what constitutes “controlling or coercive” 
 
 82. See id. at 60 (explaining that the ordinance’s failure to specify a standard of conduct 
dooms it as unconstitutionally vague).  
 83. Id. at 57.  
 84. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 369 (2010). 
 85. Id. at 367–69. 
 86. Id. at 409. 
 87. Id. at 410. 
 88. Id. at 411. 
 89. See Ortiz, supra note 18, at 698 (making note of this problem). 
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conduct would require courts to make an arguably even more open-
ended determination than previously invalidated statutory 
determinations, such as the risk-of-injury determination required by 
the invalidated clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Unlike the 
U.K. statute, this clause at least required the government to show that 
a crime had been committed at all before the court was forced to 
evaluate the risk of injury such a crime would pose in the abstract. In 
the same way that the Court concluded in Morales that the city of 
Chicago could not have intended to criminalize every instance of a 
person standing on a street in the company of a gang member, it would 
seem unlikely that any legislature motivated to criminalize coercive 
control would do so by criminalizing every single action toward an 
intimate partner that could be considered “controlling.” A standard 
dictionary definition of the verb “control” is “exercise restraining or 
directing influence over.”90 In such a world, nagging one’s partner to 
take out the garbage—clearly a form of directing influence!—could be 
a criminal offense. 
The element of the offense requiring that the coercive control has 
a “serious effect” on the victim may also be unconstitutionally vague. 
Parliament does provide more precise guidance on this prong, defining 
“serious effect” as either causing the victim to fear physical violence on 
at least two occasions or causing her91 “serious alarm or distress which 
has a substantial adverse effect on [her] usual day-to-day activities.”92 
The second category of “substantial adverse effect” would seem to 
raise questions as to what conduct is actually prohibited: If a person is 
in a bad mood throughout her work day due to a fight her husband 
picked in the morning does that become criminal coercive control? As 
with the loitering provision in Morales, it seems unlikely that any 
legislature could intend every set of facts fitting that definition to 
constitute a crime, which means that such language inherently 
delegates the choice of enforcement to the government.  
 
 90. Control, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/control 
[https://perma.cc/U5N8-AHME].  
 91. Due to most of the available studies on coercive control focusing on male perpetrators 
and female targets, this Article will sometimes use the female pronoun. As discussed in supra note 
8, however, domestic abuse occurs between partners of all genders and the recommendations of 
this Article are intended to apply gender neutrally. 
 92. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).  
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2. Overbreadth.  A law is overbroad if it prohibits not only acts the 
legislature may forbid, but also constitutionally protected conduct.93 It 
is only overbroad if it “reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct.”94 This means that for a court to declare a law 
unconstitutionally overbroad it must be so intrusive on a fundamental 
right—either qualitatively, quantitatively, or both—that its negative 
impact on free exercise outweighs the positive social benefits that flow 
from its application to other, unprotected conduct.95 Courts will not 
find a law to be void for overbreadth if there is a way to sever the 
unconstitutional portion96 or construe it in such a way as to limit its 
reach only to constitutionally permissible applications.97  
Furthermore, unlike many other constitutional claims, a 
defendant who wishes to mount an overbreadth challenge to a statute 
need not demonstrate standing: a “person whose activity may be 
constitutionally regulated nevertheless may argue that the statute 
under which he is convicted or regulated is invalid on its face” if it 
would be overbroad in some set of circumstances.98 (Courts will 
generally decline to use the overbreadth doctrine to find laws facially 
invalid if they can conclude that such laws are unconstitutional as 
applied to the particular party.99) Historically, the Supreme Court has 
applied the overbreadth doctrine primarily in the context of the First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech and on several occasions 
rejected such claims in other areas.100 Yet it remains unclear whether 
the doctrine may in fact be cognizable in other constitutional 
contexts.101 Professor John Decker points out, for example, that in 
 
 93. Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 94. Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). 
 95. John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53, 56 (2004) 
(citing Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)). 
 96. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974). 
 97. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 118–22 (1990). 
 98. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 99. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 483 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 100. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268–69 n.18 (1984).  
 101. Compare Ferber, 495 U.S. at 768 (“The doctrine is predicated on the sensitive nature of 
protected expression.”), with Decker, supra note 95, at 59  (holding a law outlawing all picketing 
contrary to the First Amendment right of association (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
97 (1940))), Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293–95 (1951) (finding a municipal ordinance to 
hold public worship meetings on the street without obtaining an advance permit facially invalid 
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
300–07 (1940) (ruling that a state statute that prohibits solicitation of money for religious, 
charitable, or philanthropic causes unless the secretary of the Public Welfare Council approves 
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right-to-privacy cases arising after Griswold v. Connecticut102 and Roe 
v. Wade,103 the Supreme Court has entertained overbreadth claims 
without rejecting them outright for not implicating the First 
Amendment.104 
In any case, it is clear that a statute criminalizing nonviolent 
coercive control could create an overbreadth problem. Namely, much 
of interpersonal controlling conduct defined by sociological 
literature—for example, “regulating” a partner’s “everyday 
behavior”—necessarily takes the form of speech. Analogous 
challenges arose to the antistalking statutes, which most states adopted 
in the 1990s in response to increased public awareness of the dangers 
of stalking behavior, particularly in the domestic violence context.105 
The content of antistalking offenses varies by state, but many have 
basic elements in common.106 For example, California, the first state to 
create such an offense, defines it as “willfully, maliciously, and 
repeatedly” following or harassing another person and making a 
“credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear 
of his or her safety.”107  
Forty-six state stalking statutes have withstood vagueness and 
overbreadth challenges.108 However, in upholding these statutes courts 
generally rely in part on their requirement that the prohibited 
 
such cause and determines the cause or religion is a bona fide organization violates the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to exercise religion), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53, 58–
60 (1967) (holding that a state statute that authorizes eavesdropping pursuant to a court order but 
on less than probable cause for a two-month period, with no termination provision or after-the-
fact notice, is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 104. Decker, supra note 95, at 90. 
 105. J. Alan Baty, Alabama’s Stalking Statutes: Coming Out of the Shadows, 48 ALA. L. REV. 
229, 229–30 (1996).  
 106. As the American Law Reports explain: 
  Although antistalking statutes, in general terms, have some similarities, 
considerable variation is to be found regarding: (a) what course of conduct suffices to 
constitute stalking, assuming the presence of any requisite mental state and risked or 
resulting consequences; (b) what varieties of fear suffice to establish the risked or 
resulting consequences, including whether that fear must be established by a subjective 
test, an objective test, or both; (c) what kind of mental state the stalker must have, and, 
in particular, whether the mental state must exist only as to the underlying conduct or 
instead or in addition as to the fear-producing consequences; and (d) what aggravating 
circumstances suffice to make the crime of stalking a higher level offense. 
6 George L. Blum, Validity of State Stalking Statutes, A.L.R. 7TH 491, 495–96 (2015). 
 107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2020).  
 108. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 93 n.237 (2009). 
SHELEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
2021] CRIMINALIZING COERCIVE CONTROL 1343 
harassing conduct include at least an implied threat of physical injury 
or fear thereof on the part of the victim.109 It is well settled that the free 
speech right does not prevent a state from criminalizing threats due to 
the overriding interest in protecting its citizens “from the fear of 
violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”110 Thus, while 
antistalking statutes are directed at a particular form of interpersonal 
behavior—a pattern of unwanted conduct or pursuit—they are 
nonetheless typically grounded in the existence of a physical threat or 
fear thereof to pass First Amendment overbreadth scrutiny. This 
Article will discuss the relevance of antistalking statutes to the coercive 
control question in much greater detail in Part II.D. For now, it is 
simply worth noting that the new U.K. law lacks a requirement of 
threatened physical violence, as it defines “serious effects” on the 
victim to include not only fear of violence but also mere “distress” that 
has a “substantial effect” on day-to-day activities. The U.K. statute as 
written would therefore raise significant overbreadth questions in the 
United States. 
3. Prohibition on “Thought Crimes.”  The third substantive 
objection to a coercive control offense also relates to the First 
Amendment, but it is a bit more theoretical than doctrinal. Most First 
Amendment scholars recognize an implicit right to “freedom of 
thought,” which appears nowhere in the Constitution but is arguably 
implied in the right to freedom of expression.111 Some scholars argue 
that the First Amendment is intended to protect the self-realization of 
the individual citizen, a theory which, if accepted, requires 
“governmental respect for the sanctity of an individual’s thought 
 
 109. See, e.g., State v. Randall, 669 So. 2d 223, 226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); People v. Borrelli, 
77 Cal. App. 4th 703, 713–14 (5th Dist. 2000); People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1231–32 (Colo. 1999); 
United States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 388 (D.C. 1996); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 227 (1995); 
Clements v. State, 19 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2000). But see People v. 
Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341, 356 (Ill. 2017) (striking down as unconstitutionally overbroad the 
subsection of the revised Illinois stalking statute that makes it criminal to negligently 
“communicate[] to or about” a person, “where the speaker knows or should know the 
communication would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress”). 
 110. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
 111. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime 
Sentencing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 32 (1992) 
(noting that freedom of expression presupposes freedom of thought).  
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processes.”112 Others argue that the First Amendment speaks not of 
individual development but to popular sovereignty and democratic 
processes.113 But even under this model, “to be effective citizens in a 
democratic society, individuals must be able to exercise free will—an 
impossibility if governmental thought control is permitted.”114 For 
example, critics of sentencing enhancements for “hate” crimes argue 
that “[b]ecause such laws are adopted for the very purpose of 
penalizing thought processes and political motivations found to be 
offensive by those in power, they constitute classic abridgements of the 
constitutionally protected freedom of thought.”115 Hate-crime 
enhancements have passed constitutional scrutiny, but it is important 
to note that they nonetheless require indisputably criminal acts as their 
predicates.116 
The potential First Amendment prohibition on punishing thought 
tracks with the even older common law requirement that a crime 
contain a voluntary act element.117 As Professor Michael Corrado 
summarizes it:  
  No one should be punished except for something she does. She 
shouldn’t be punished for what wasn’t done at all; she shouldn’t be 
punished for what someone else does; she shouldn’t be punished for 
being the sort of person she is . . . . Our conduct is what justifies 
punishing us.118 
The common law preference for action as the basis of criminal liability 
explains why even attempt statutes punish only those attempters who 
have taken a “substantial step” or “overt act” toward accomplishing 
their criminal goals.119 
Against this backdrop, the idea of a coercive control offense 
premised on otherwise legal conduct raises some concerns. If a person 
does things that are in and of themselves legal to do—such as 
 
 112. See, e.g., id. 
 113. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) (“The principle of 
the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government . . . . It is a 
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal 
suffrage.”). 
 114. Redish, supra note 111, at 32.  
 115. Id. at 37. 
 116. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993). 
 117. Michael Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
1529, 1529 (1994). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-4-2 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405 (2017). 
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constantly complaining about or insulting his partner’s actions or 
allocating financial resources (to the extent otherwise legal under the 
property laws)—he might well qualify as coercively controlling under 
the U.K. statute. Yet in such cases it appears to be the coercive 
motivation (in addition to the emotional effects on the victim)—that 
attracts the criminal sanction. By contrast, hate-crime enhancements 
increase the punishment for already criminal conduct based on the 
biased motivation of the defendant. If such enhancements have raised 
colorable freedom-of-thought objections, a coercive control offense 
would surely attract more forceful ones. 
B. Evidentiary Problems 
The U.K. experience has also generated some discussion about the 
pragmatic evidentiary problems attendant to charging and convicting 
someone of coercive control. In the first place, U.K. scholarship 
suggests that law enforcement is not particularly good at identifying 
what constitutes coercive control120 (though other research indicates 
that they have gotten somewhat better at it with the increased attention 
to the problem in public discourse121). This stands to reason: our 
understanding of the harms of coercive control comes from complex, 
controversial psychological and sociological research, not easily 
digested by nonspecialists.  
Furthermore, coercive control prosecutions are likely to be 
hampered by a big problem common to sexual assault cases and 
domestic violence cases more generally: victim credibility. The fact of 
the matter is that traumatized victims simply don’t make very good 
witnesses.122 Research indicates that during a traumatic incident the 
brain switches off the parts of itself associated with self-awareness,123 
resulting in a dissociation in which aspects of the experience—such as 
 
 120. See, e.g., Amanda L. Robinson, Gillian M. Pinchevsky & Jennifer Guthrie, Under the 
Radar: Policing Non-Violent Domestic Abuse in the US and UK, 40 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED 
CRIM. JUST. 195, 195 (2016) (finding that “the use of physical violence is at the forefront of many 
officers’ expectations about domestic abuse, and that when physical violence is absent, the police 
response is less proactive”).  
 121. See, e.g., id.  
 122. Charlotte Bishop & Vanessa Bettinson, Evidencing Domestic Violence, Including 
Behaviour that Falls Under the New Offence of “Controlling or Coercive Behaviour,” 22 INT’L J. 
EVID. & PROOF 3, 15 (2018) [hereinafter Bishop & Bettinson, Evidencing].  
 123. See generally PAUL FREWEN & RUTH LANIUS, HEALING THE TRAUMATIZED SELF: 
CONSCIOUSNESS, NEUROSCIENCE AND TREATMENT (2015) (describing the brain processes 
associated with trauma).   
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consciousness, memory, emotions, bodily sensations, thoughts, and 
sensory perceptions—split off, or dissociate, from one another.124 Once 
these aspects of experience dissociate, the trauma victim is unlikely to 
recall them as a cohesive memory.125 As the very essence of the 
coercive control offense requires that the defendant’s behavior has had 
a “serious effect” on the victim, it would seem almost to require that 
the government prove trauma as an element of the offense. Yet if a 
trauma victim cannot recall a cohesive account of her experience, her 
testimony lacks the indicia of credibility adequate to prove anything 
under traditional principles of evidence law.126 On the flip side, if we 
take these testimonial limitations as evidence of trauma, how do we 
distinguish a genuine account from one in which the lack of coherence 
arises from lying? These questions are hardly unique to the offense of 
coercive control, but they are particularly confounding in this context, 
where there is less likely to be physical or other supporting evidence. 
C. Policy Problems 
Even if there were no blackletter legal barriers to criminalizing 
coercive control, there are a number of very good reasons why we 
might hesitate to do so. The policy debate in the United Kingdom has 
generated a great deal of controversy, with strong counterarguments 
advanced on behalf of potential defendants and victims of coercive 
control alike. Critics fear harm to potential victims for several reasons. 
Some have argued that criminalizing coercive control will have the 
perverse effect of reducing public awareness of its prevalence. For 
example, due to the complexity of coercive control in reality, Professor 
Julia Tolmie fears that the justice system will be unequipped to respond 
to a sufficient number of cases, apart from those involving extreme 
physical abuse.127 This, she worries, will give the false impression that 
coercive control occurs rarely.128 Other scholars cite the existing 
“patchy” enforcement numbers for the new statute to cast doubt on 
law enforcement’s ability to translate clinical practice into the legal 
 
 124. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 477 (4th ed. 1994).  
 125. Bishop & Bettinson, Evidencing, supra note 122, at 15. 
 126. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 377 (3d ed. 2012) (listing “perception,” “memory,” and 
“narration” as three of the four “testimonial capacities” in evidence law).  
 127. Julia R. Tolmie, Coercive Control: To Criminalize or Not To Criminalize?, 18 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 50, 50 (2018). 
 128. Id. at 60. 
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context, which would prevent actual access to justice for most 
victims.129 
On the other side of the coin, it is a valid concern that—as was said 
of the previously controversial stalking statutes and domestic violence 
laws generally130—a party to a failing or otherwise acrimonious 
relationship could take advantage of the apparent expansiveness of the 
coercive control offense to use the criminal law as a weapon against 
their partner. Even if a statute could be drafted in a way that fell short 
of constitutional vagueness problems, the lack of a physical threat 
requirement would seem to sweep into the statute’s potential ambit a 
great deal of behavior we might not want to criminalize out of purely 
liberty concerns. Or, even worse, it might create an incentive for a 
partner seeking legal advantage in a divorce to make false accusations. 
The evidentiary problems already discussed amplify these concerns. 
III.  SOLUTIONS IN OTHER SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES 
For all the many apparent legal problems associated with 
criminalizing coercive control, the idea of nonphysical, nonpecuniary 
criminal harm is hardly unknown to Western conceptions of justice. At 
the most abstract level, the European Court of Human Rights has 
interpreted the personal integrity provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to include protection against “moral 
suffering and degrading treatment that creates a sense of fear, anxiety, 
and inferiority in order to humiliate, degrade, and break the victim’s 
resistance.”131 But we need not look to international conventions 
around state misconduct for our only examples. This Part surveys the 
other areas of American substantive criminal law relevant to legally 
 
 129. Sandra Walklate, Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Jude McCulloch, Is More Law the Answer? 
Seeking Justice for Victims of Intimate Partner Violence Through the Reform of Legal Categories, 
18 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 115, 118 (2018). 
 130. See, e.g., James Thomas Tucker, Stalking the Problems with Stalking Laws: The 
Effectiveness of Florida Statutes Section 784.048, 45 FLA. L. REV. 609, 627 n.153 (1993) (stating 
that an increase in protective orders in Florida in 1992 “was a result of three things: (1) battered 
spouses have been educated about domestic violence; (2) the new domestic violence laws make it 
easier to enforce the orders, encouraging their use; and (3) according to some defense attorneys, 
‘estranged spouses are using domestic violence claims to bolster their divorce cases’” (citing Jill 
Spitz, Domestic Violence Coming Out of the Closet, Into the Courtroom, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(Lake Sentinel ed.), May 30, 1993, at 1)). 
 131. Julie Lantrip, Torture and Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment in the 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 551, 552 
(1999) (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975)). 
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defining coercive control. Starting with the most clearly analogous 
points of comparison—criminal emotional abuse of children and elders 
and stalking—and moving into structurally analogous commercial and 
financial crimes, this Part shows how American law has wrestled with 
vagueness and overbreadth issues in ways that should inform a 
legislature seeking to draft a coercive control offense. 
A. Child and Elder Abuse 
1. Child Abuse.  Child abuse laws provide a seemingly relevant 
model for a coercive control offense insofar as the legal concept of 
child abuse has always included the category of pure emotional 
abuse.132 In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act (“CAPTA”) which identified a minimum set of acts or 
behaviors, including emotional abuse, which constitute legal child 
abuse or neglect.133 Unlike general physical crimes such as assault, 
which apply to everyone alike, CAPTA addresses a broader range of 
abuse, both physical and nonphysical, but only when it happens to a 
child at the hands of a “parent or caretaker.”134 Because CAPTA ties 
federal grant money to states developing programs modeled after the 
federal act, state child abuse laws have some basic features in 
common.135 For example, the states all follow the federal requirement 
that they designate certain individuals with regular professional 
contact with children as “mandatory reporters” of suspected child 
abuse.136 
Although the precise substantive laws vary from state to state, 
most recognize the four general categories of abuse designated in 
 
 132. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 215 (1996) 
(listing three categories of emotional abuse).  
 133. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”), 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(2) (2018), 
as amended by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003 (defining child abuse and 
neglect as “any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in 
death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act 
which presents an imminent risk of serious harm”). 
 134. Id.   
 135. See Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional Value 
of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 942–43 (2004) (listing child abuse–related 
legislation that conditioned federal grants on development of programs to prevent child abuse). 
 136. Bridget A. Blinn, Focusing on Children: Providing Counsel to Children in Expedited 
Proceedings To Terminate Parental Rights, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 812 (2004). 
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CAPTA: physical, sexual, neglect, and emotional.137 Unlike physical 
abuse, definitions of “emotional abuse” vary quite widely. Some states 
simply define “child abuse” to include the causing of “emotional harm” 
or “mental injury,” without further elaboration.138 However, the codes 
of approximately thirty-three states provide specific definitions of 
emotional or mental child abuse.139 The overwhelming majority define 
emotional abuse in terms of the provable injury to the child. Typically, 
“injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of the child 
as evidenced by an observable or substantial change in behavior, 
emotional response, or cognition” and “injury as evidenced by ‘anxiety, 
depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior.’”140 Some states even 
write the requirement of professional diagnosis into the definition of 
the offense, as with Alaska’s requirement that the existence of a 
“mental injury” be “supported by the opinion of a qualified expert 
witness.”141 
Critics have pointed out that this legal focus on medically 
observable harm in the victim, rather than on the abuser’s conduct, has 
allowed recognizably egregious abusers to go unpunished when the 
government could not show a visible effect on the child.142 (And this 
despite the fact that even an influential report from the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) identified 
“[v]erbal or [e]motional [a]ssault” as a form of emotional abuse, and 
defined it purely in terms of the abuser’s conduct: “[h]abitual patterns 
of belittling, denigrating, scapegoating, or other . . . forms of overtly 
hostile or rejecting treatment.”143) The documented evidentiary 
problems caused by the harm-based definition of emotional child abuse 
 
 137. Shauneen M. Garrahan & Andrew W. Eichner, Tipping the Scale: A Place for Childhood 
Obesity in the Evolving Legal Framework of Child Abuse and Neglect, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
& ETHICS 336, 351–52 (2012) (citing R. KIM OATES, THE SPECTRUM OF CHILD ABUSE 2 (1996)). 
 138. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD.’S BUREAU, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3 (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q2G3-PKCM]. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See generally id. (collecting all state definitions of child abuse). 
 141. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290 (2019). 
 142. See J. Robert Shull, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse: Notes on Discourse, 
History, and Change, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1665, 1665–68 (1999) (recounting two such cases, one in 
which a mother forced her thirteen-year-old daughter to eat hot peppers as a punishment for 
lying, cut off her hair, and chained her to a tree for three days; and another in which a mother 
locked her thirteen-year-old daughter in a closet for seventeen hours, naked, without food or 
water, and only a bucket for a bathroom). 
 143. Sedlak & Broadhurst, supra note 132, at 2–15.  
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support the criticism, discussed in Part II.B, of the “serious effect” 
element of the U.K. coercive control statute, which depends on 
potentially traumatized victims being able to testify about harms they 
may not be able to narrate coherently. 
A handful of states, however, have adopted some version of a 
conduct-based definition of emotional child abuse. Connecticut’s code 
states that abuse includes “emotional maltreatment,” which appears 
conduct based, though the law provides no definition of 
maltreatment.144 A few states include in the offense not only emotional 
injury but the threat of such injury, which eases the requirement of 
medical proof. For example, Illinois defines abuse to include 
“impairment of . . . emotional health” or “substantial risk of . . . 
impairment of . . . emotional health.”145 The only state to adopt a clear 
conduct-based definition of emotional child abuse is Delaware, which 
defines it as “threats to inflict undue physical or emotional harm, and/
or chronic or recurring incidents of ridiculing, demeaning, making 
derogatory remarks or cursing.”146 
The legal recognition of emotional child abuse has posed some 
challenges, similar to those arising with coercive control. Like the 
physical and mental harms of coercive control in domestic 
relationships, the effects of emotional abuse on children are well 
documented.147 Yet, the psychological literature also suggests society 
tends to focus on the physical realm as more important than the 
psychological, and even clinicians prioritize actual or threatened 
physical injury.148 Furthermore, as with coercive control and domestic 
violence generally, critics of child abuse laws point out the risk that 
false claims of emotional child abuse will arise as parents try to win 
custody disputes.149 
 
 144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-120(5)(C) (2020).  
 145. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3 (2020). 
 146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(10) (2020).  
 147. See Peter Thomas, Protection, Dissociation, and Internal Roles: Modeling and Treating 
the Effects of Child Abuse, 7 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 364, 366 (2003) (reporting that 80 percent of 
young adults who were emotionally abused as children are not successful at psychosocial 
functioning).  
 148. See, e.g., Lynn Sorsoli, Hurt Feelings: Emotional Abuse and the Failure of Empathy, 4 J. 
EMOTIONAL ABUSE 1, 3 (2004); James A. Twaite & Ofelia Rodriguez-Srednicki, Understanding 
and Reporting Child Abuse: Legal and Psychological Perspective: Part Two: Emotional Abuse and 
Secondary Abuse, 32 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 444 (2004). 
 149. See Robert W. Kerns, Crying Wolf: The Use of False Accusations of Abuse To Influence 
Child Custodianship and a Proposal To Protect the Innocent, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 603, 607 (2015) 
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With this backdrop, coupled with the varying, vague, and 
underinclusive legal definitions of emotional abuse, it is unsurprising 
that the reporting rates of emotional child abuse vary wildly across the 
country, especially when compared with reporting rates for physical or 
sexual abuse, which remain relatively consistent from state to state.150 
A 2007 report from the Administration for Children and Families at 
HHS found that on cases of abuse initiated by mandatory reporters, 
eight states recorded emotional abuse in 10–20 percent of child abuse 
cases, ten states in less than 10 percent, and twenty-four states in less 
than 1 percent, while five reported no cases of emotional abuse at all.151  
2. Elder Abuse.  Historical accident has linked the legal response 
to child abuse to the distinct problem of elder abuse, which attracted 
public concern after a 1981 congressional report drew national 
attention to the issue.152 Legislators responded using the recently 
adopted child abuse statutes as models for elder abuse statutes, 
meaning that the elder abuse legislation largely follows the mandatory 
reporting model of CAPTA and its state progeny.153 Professor Joseph 
Barber argues that such a model is inappropriate for elder abuse 
because, first, elderly adults are more socially isolated than children; 
second, elders should be accorded a higher degree of respect 
concerning their self-determination; and third, elder abuse is difficult 
to diagnose.154 He further argues that elder abuse should be treated 
more like domestic violence, due to the shared characteristics of the 
cycle of violence and dynamic of power and control between abuser 
and victim, involving—in both cases—fear of humiliation and shame 
that causes victims not to report.155 Barber’s solution is increased 
 
(citing Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce and 
Custody Disputes, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 451, 452–53 (1991), which estimates the occurrence of false 
accusations of child sexual abuse as between 20 and 80 percent). 
 150. Andrew Ford, Note, State Child Emotional Abuse Laws: Their Failure To Protect 
Children with Gender Identity Disorder, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 642, 643 (2011). 
 151. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. ON CHILD., YOUTH & FAMS., CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 43–44 (2007), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm07.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7WTD-XU4N]. 
 152. See Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse and the States’ Adult Protective Services 
Response: Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 869 (1991). 
 153. See Joseph W. Barber, Note, The Kids Aren’t All Right: The Failure of Child Abuse 
Statutes as a Model for Elder Abuse Statutes, 16 ELDER L.J. 107, 116 (2008). 
 154. Id. at 120. 
 155. Id. at 124 
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penalties for abusers and efforts to empower victims to change their 
situations themselves.156 Although his proposal does not distinguish 
between physical and emotional abuse and the unique legal issues 
surrounding the latter, it underscores the potential sociological 
relationship between elder abuse and domestic coercive control. 
Like the child abuse statutes they model, however, elder abuse 
statutes typically define emotional abuse by the observable mental 
injury to the victim, rather than by offender conduct. The familiar 
challenges for prosecutors of an injury-based standard are, if anything, 
most marked in the elder abuse context, as many elderly patients suffer 
from conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, or strokes. 
These patients often cannot remember or understand their abuse.157 In 
1992, Vermont Attorney General Jeffrey L. Amestoy stated in an 
official report that the definition of elder abuse “is so vague and 
difficult to prove that [his office] has never brought charges under this 
statute” and urged legislators to redraft it to “incorporate the concepts 
of cruelty and mistreatment.”158 Like its child abuse statute, Delaware’s 
definition of elder abuse is directed at abusive conduct rather than 
injury, and includes: 
a pattern of emotional abuse, which includes, but is not limited to, 
ridiculing or demeaning an adult who is impaired making derogatory 
remarks to an adult who is impaired or cursing or threatening to inflict 
physical or emotional harm on an adult who is impaired.159 
The Delaware statute aside, most state elder abuse statutes would 
appear to raise similar practical shortcomings as potential models for a 
coercive control offense. 
3. Constitutional Problems.  Both child and elder abuse statutes 
have faced constitutional challenges to their emotional abuse 
provisions on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. The Nevada 
Supreme Court held facially void for vagueness a statute making it a 
misdemeanor to “annoy[] or molest[] a minor,” due to the lack of 
 
 156. Id. at 131. 
 157. Robert Polisky, Criminalizing Physical and Emotional Elder Abuse, 3 ELDER L.J. 377, 
395 (1995). 
 158. Id. at 395–96 (citing JEFFREY L. AMESTOY, ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF VT., OFF. OF ATT’Y 
GEN., PEOPLE IN NEED OF CARE: A POPULATION AT RISK 8 (1992)). 
 159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3902(1) (2020). 
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specificity as to what sorts of annoying behaviors were prohibited.160 
By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s criminal 
child abuse statute, which prohibited, among other things, the 
“intentional infliction of . . . mental injury upon a child” did not render 
it unconstitutionally vague, even though “mental injury” was not 
defined.161 The court relied on the fact that Florida law elsewhere, in 
its child welfare provisions, defines “mental injury” as “an injury to the 
intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a 
discernible and substantial impairment in his ability to function within 
his normal range of performance and behavior,” which should put a 
defendant on notice of the sorts of mental injuries the child abuse 
statute includes.162 The court also noted that such injury “will be 
present only in limited circumstances” and, thus, will not encourage 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.163  
However, to avoid overbreadth problems, a Florida court of 
appeal construed the same statute as inapplicable to mental injury 
caused by speech of any kind, because the statute’s prohibition could 
otherwise extend to speech protected under the First Amendment.164 
Coming to the opposite conclusion, a New York family court held that 
mere words were sufficient to constitute child abuse under the child 
welfare laws, provided they cause a physical injury to the child that falls 
within the language of the statute—in this case, a fourteen-year-old 
boy’s stomach pains caused by his father’s repeated verbal attacks on 
his sexuality.165 The court noted, however, the civil nature of the family 
court proceeding as relevant to this interpretation.166 
Those cases, of course, involved the more common, injury-based 
definition of emotional abuse. In Robinson v. State,167 the Delaware 
Supreme Court considered vagueness and overbreadth challenges to 
Delaware’s conduct-based definition.168 In this case, the defendant 
 
 160. City of Las Vegas v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 477, 479 (Nev. 2002) (quoting 1995 
Nev. Stat. 1240).  
 161. Dufresne v. State, 826 So. 2d 272, 273–74 (Fla. 2002) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1) 
(Supp. 1996)). 
 162. Id. at 276, 279 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1977)). 
 163. Id. at 278. 
 164. Munao v. State, 939 So. 2d 125, 127–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 165. In re Shane T., 115 Misc. 2d 161, 164 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982).  
 166. Id. 
 167. Robinson v. State, 600 A.2d 356 (Del. 1991). 
 168. Id. at 362.  
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challenged the constitutionality of the Delaware patient abuse statute, 
a precursor to the elder abuse statute, with nearly identical language 
prohibiting “ridiculing or demeaning a patient or resident, making 
derogatory remarks to a patient or resident or cursing directed towards 
a patient or resident.”169 The court rejected the challenge on both 
grounds, though largely for reasons related to the statute’s specific 
application to patient victims.  
On the overbreadth claim the court applied First Amendment 
precedent on “captive” audiences, which requires courts to balance the 
defendant’s free speech right against the government’s interest in 
protecting the privacy rights of those, such as homeowners, who cannot 
avoid the speech.170 (In the patient setting, the victims are captive due 
to the necessity of seeking in-patient or at-home medical care).171 On 
the vagueness claim the court found it dispositive that the statute only 
protects patients and residents of facilities, and only against prohibited 
acts that occur within the facilities (along with the facts that the statute 
punishes only “knowing[]” violations and defines “ridiculing” or 
“demeaning” according to an objective standard).172 For these reasons, 
the court held that the patient abuse statute defined the offense of 
emotional abuse with sufficient definiteness such that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited.173 
The current state of child and elder emotional abuse law thus 
raises both pragmatic and constitutional problems likely to be 
amplified in the context of coercive control. First off, it is easy to see 
why the U.K. Parliament chose such pliable language to define the 
harm element of coercive control: even with the testimonial limitations 
of traumatized victims, prosecutors may have a somewhat easier time 
proving that abuse had a “substantial effect” on a victim than they do 
proving a clinical emotional or mental injury under American abuse 
law. Yet it is precisely this tough definition of harm that the Florida 
Supreme Court relied on in rejecting the vagueness challenge to the 
emotional abuse offense. The fact that such significant mental injuries 
will be “present only in limited circumstances” is why the court held 
the statute will not encourage discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement. 
 
 169. Polisky, supra note 157, at 397 n.133, 403 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1131(1) 
(Michie Supp. 1994)).  
 170. Robinson, 600 A.2d at 364. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 365. 
 173. Id. at 366. 
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In other words, if an emotional abuse statute relies on a precise 
definition of observable mental injury it may pass constitutional muster 
but be ineffective. Furthermore, to the limited extent they have 
weighed in on the issue, courts seem divided over the question of 
whether the abuse statutes criminalizing pure speech that causes 
emotional injury can pass overbreadth scrutiny, which would eliminate 
a lot of conduct a coercive control statute should target. These 
problems, alone, should give legislators pause before turning to 
emotional abuse under these laws as a model for coercive control. 
It should also be noted that, even if child and elder emotional 
abuse laws themselves withstand future vagueness and overbreadth 
challenges, their power as a foundation for a coercive control offense 
may be limited. Like CAPTA, most state child abuse laws target 
caregivers and parents, who already have a heightened duty of care to 
their charges under the negligence laws of most jurisdictions. Parental 
and caregiving relationships already give rise to unique duties under 
the common law. For example, while it is a general principle that 
people cannot be prosecuted for their merely immoral omissions to 
render assistance, the existence of a particular family relationship 
between two parties is one of the common law exceptions to that rule 
that creates a duty to rescue and, thus, a basis for culpable homicide by 
omission.174 A similar heightened duty of care exists in the case of 
undertakings, such as when professionals care for the well-being of 
elderly patients.175 It may be relevant for due process purposes that 
child and elder abuse laws affect primarily people in these existing legal 
classes. 
That said, it is further relevant that the law also generally 
recognizes a parallel spouse-to-spouse duty of care, which means that 
if a husband “realizes (or culpably fails to realize) his wife is in danger, 
realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that he can rescue her with 
minimal risk and/or sacrifice, and realizes (or culpably fails to realize) 
that she is his wife,” then he can be liable for criminal homicide.176 Thus 
spouses, caretakers, and parents all technically fall into the same 
category when it comes to the law recognizing heightened duties of 
care, at least in the realm of negligent homicide. This may suggest that 
 
 174. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of Issues, in CRIMINAL 
LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 121, 139 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester 
eds., 2002) (emphasis omitted).  
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a coercive control statute that imposes a duty between spouses to avoid 
causing emotional harm may pose, at least, no greater due process 
problems than the parallel parent–child and caretaker–elder duties 
embodied in the child and elder abuse laws. Yet it is unclear that the 
existence of these heightened, relational duties to rescue from physical 
harm translate into the realm of emotional harm, such as to negate all 
vagueness and overbreadth problems associated with punishing 
emotional child, elder, or spousal abuse. And in any case, courts are 
already reluctant to recognize even the traditional duty-to-rescue as a 
basis for negligent homicide in cases involving unmarried romantic 
partners, which many victims of coercive control are.177  
It may be the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis in the Robinson 
case that best illustrates the danger of assuming a legislature could 
simply expand child or elder emotional abuse law to cover cases of 
coercive control between intimate partners. The Robinson court, 
remember, rejected the defendant’s overbreadth challenge on the 
“captive audience” grounds, based on the fact that a patient—like a 
homeowner—cannot escape offensive speech, and the defendant lacks 
an unrestrained First Amendment right to impose it under those 
circumstances. That argument can readily be extended to children and, 
at least, infirm elders, who by virtue of their intrinsic status lack the 
independence to leave an emotionally abusive situation. One could try 
to argue, similarly, that an emotionally abused partner is often 
psychologically incapable of leaving a coercively controlling 
relationship. Such a theory, however, presupposes the issue in 
question. It would certainly violate due process to limit a defendant’s 
constitutional objections due to the presumed existence of exactly the 
state of affairs for which he is being prosecuted in the first place. In 
short, the potential due process issues around emotional abuse, which 
courts have not fully resolved as to child and elder abuse law, would 
likely be amplified if similarly worded legislation applied to intimate 
partners.  
B. Stalking  
As mentioned above, stalking, a form of harassment, is a criminal 
offense of relatively recent vintage that is similar to coercive control 
insofar as they both target patterns of conduct someone engages in to 
 
 177. See Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. 
L. REV. 1327, 1336–37 (2008).  
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impose himself or herself mentally on another person.178 (The typical 
state criminal code now defines stalking as the intentional, repeated 
following of a person for the purpose of harassing them.179) Most 
stalking statutes contain an element of physical threat of violence or 
death,180 thereby placing them squarely within the “true threats” 
exception to the First Amendment.181 However, at least nine 
jurisdictions provide for stalking liability on a showing that the 
defendant has caused the victim some form of emotional distress.182 
 
 178. See discussion of stalking in supra notes 105–10. The most obvious difference, of course, 
being that the paradigmatic case of stalking involves strangers, acquaintances, or former intimate 
partners, whereas coercive control explicitly involves ongoing personal relationships.  
 179. Stalking, in NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 923 (Richard A. Leiter, ed.).  
 180. Id.  
 181. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).  
 182. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-602(1)(c) (2019) (listing as a form of stalking 
“knowingly . . . [r]epeatedly follow[ing], approach[ing], contact[ing], plac[ing] under surveillance, 
or mak[ing] any form of communication with another person or [listed others] in a manner that 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause [such 
distress]”); D.C. CODE § 22-3133(a)(2) (2020) (listing as a form of stalking “purposefully 
engag[ing] in course of conduct directed at a specific individual . . . [t]hat the person knows [or 
should have known] would cause that individual reasonably to[] [f]ear for his or her safety or the 
safety of another person[,] [f]eel seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened[,] or [s]uffer 
emotional distress”); IDAHO CODE §  18-7906(1) (2020) (defining second-degree stalking as 
“[k]nowingly and maliciously[] engag[ing] in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or 
harasses the victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress[] 
or . . . fear of death or physical injury [to self], or . . . a family or household member”); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.3(a) (2020) (defining stalking as knowing engagement in a course of conduct 
directed at a specific person knowing it would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety of self 
or a third person or to suffer other emotional distress); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2.A (2020) 
(defining misdemeanor stalking as “the intentional and repeated following or harassing . . . that 
would cause a reasonable person to feel alarmed or to suffer emotional distress”); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A(1) (2019) (listing as a definition of stalking “intentionally or knowingly 
engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at . . . a specific person that would cause a reasonable 
person[] to suffer serious inconvenience or emotional distress”); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.225(2) 
(2017) (defining first-degree stalking as “purposely, through his or her course of conduct, 
disturb[ing], or follow[ing] with the intent of disturbing another person”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
45-5-220(1) (2019) (defining stalking as purposely or knowingly causing another substantial 
emotional distress or reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or death by repeatedly following 
the person or harassing, threatening, or intimidating him or her in person or by mail, electronic 
communication or any other method); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (Consol. 2020) (listing, as 
fourth-degree stalking: “intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engag[ing] in a course of 
conduct . . . [when one] knows or reasonably should know that such conduct . . . causes material 
harm to the mental or emotional health of [a] person, where such conduct consists of following, 
telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such person’s 
immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and the actor was 
previously clearly informed to cease that conduct”); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 76-5-106.5(2) (2020) 
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Many of these provisions have withstood vagueness or First 
Amendment overbreadth challenges in state appellate courts.183 They 
would therefore seem to provide examples of more precise statutory 
language that might remove some of the constitutionally problematic 
ambiguity from the U.K. definition of coercive control. 
For example, Colorado defines stalking as: “knowingly . . . 
[r]epeatedly follow[ing], approach[ing], contact[ing], plac[ing] under 
surveillance, or mak[ing] any form of communication with another 
person . . . in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
serious emotional distress and does cause” such distress.184 This would 
appear to criminalize the knowing act of communication itself 
assuming objectively reasonable emotional distress results. In a 
vagueness challenge to this provision the Colorado Supreme Court 
found that 
[e]ven though a person is not required to actually know that his or her 
acts towards the victim are not innocuous, [the law] is not vague 
because a reasonable person could know that the only acts prohibited 
are those that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious 
emotional distress and do in fact cause such distress.185  
The court then held the offense was not constitutionally vague because 
it connects a defendant’s acts “to both an objective standard and a 
palpable result” and because it “does not criminalize innocuous 
behavior.”186  
New York defines fourth-degree stalking as 
intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engag[ing] in a course of 
conduct [that the defendant] knows or reasonably should know . . . 
 
(making it a class A misdemeanor to intentionally or knowingly cause a reasonable person to fear 
for him/herself or a third person or to suffer other emotional distress).  
 183. See, e.g., Beachum v. United States, 197 A.3d 508, 510–11 (D.C. 2018) (holding a statute 
requiring “the defendant ‘should have known’ that the defendant’s conduct ‘would cause a 
reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances’ to suffer fear, serious alarm, or emotional 
distress” constitutional); State v. Dean, No. 43201, 2016 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 539, at *20 
(Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016); State v. Elliott, 987 A.2d 513, 519 (Me. 2010); State v. 
Schleiermacher, 924 S.W.2d 269, 276 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (“A word or phrase is not 
unconstitutionally vague merely because of some ambiguity.”); State v. Adgerson, 78 P.3d 850, 
856 (Mont. 2003) (“[S]talking another person is not constitutionally protected behavior.”); State 
v. Weisberg, 62 P.3d 457, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting the defendant’s overbreadth and 
vagueness arguments). 
 184. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-602(1)(c) (2019). 
 185. People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 78 (Colo. 2006). 
 186. Id. 
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[will] cause[] material harm to the mental or emotional health of [a] 
person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or 
initiating communication or contact with such person . . . and the actor 
was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.187 
Although the New York statute contains the added element that 
the defendant has been previously told to desist, like Colorado’s 
version it imposes liability in cases where “communication” causes 
mental or emotional harm.188 In rejecting a vagueness challenge to this 
provision, in which the defendant primarily challenged the “no 
legitimate purpose” language, a New York appeals court pointed to the 
ways in which the various elements of the offense worked together to 
create the constitutionally requisite specificity.189 The court noted that 
the offense contains an intent requirement as to the conduct itself, such 
that “[t]o be convicted, the person must have intended to engage in a 
course of conduct targeted at a specific individual” and could not be 
guilty of stalking through accidental conduct.190  
Applying its precedent from a similarly structured statute 
criminalizing “jostling,” the court further held that the prosecution 
need not prove that the defendant intended that the conduct have the 
particular effect of causing emotional distress.191 Rather, the court 
concluded, the stalking statute prohibited “a certain intentional course 
of conduct regardless of the wrongdoer’s underlying purpose or 
motive.”192 Nonetheless, the court held that the “no legitimate 
purpose” language combined with the lack of specific intent element 
as to motive did not render the crime unconstitutionally vague. The 
statute, the court said, “contains lucid provisos clearly applicable to 
defendant’s conduct: The course of conduct must be intentional; it 
must be aimed at a specific person; and the offender must know (or 
have reason to know) that his conduct will (or likely will) instill 
reasonable fear of material harm in the victim.”193 Notably, the court 
accepted without comment the fact that fear of pure emotional harm 
would suffice to meet the elements of the offense. 
 
 187. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45. 
 188. Id. § 120.45(2).  
 189. People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 39 (N.Y. 2003). 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting People v. Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 303 (1987)). 
 193. Id. at 41. 
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Not all stalking offenses have fared so well in state court, however. 
Illinois courts have held the emotional distress–based provisions of the 
Illinois stalking statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad. In People 
v. Relerford,194 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a provision 
making it a crime knowingly to “communicate[] to or about” a specific 
person two or more times where the defendant knows or should know 
the communications would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
emotional distress.195 The court found that the statute reached “a vast 
array of circumstances that limit speech far beyond the generally 
understood meaning of stalking,” criminalized “a host of social 
interactions that a person would find distressing but are clearly 
understood to fall within the protections of the first amendment,” and 
was thus facially overbroad.196 As the court noted, “The phrase 
‘communicates to or about’ was stricken from the Stalking Statute, and 
the remaining provisions were left intact.”197 These included a 
provision making it criminal stalking for a person to “knowingly 
‘threaten[]’ a specific person two or more times when he or she knows 
or should know that the threats would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer emotional distress.”198  
In People v. Morocho,199 the Illinois Appellate Court considered 
an appeal from conviction under this “threat”-based portion of the 
offense and found that it, too, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The 
court stated: 
  Many times a person who twice threatens lawful action unrelated 
to violence and actually intends to trigger distress of another for the 
purpose of motivation is not a criminal stalker; he or she is an 
ordinary member of society engaged in any number of expressive 
actions attendant to everyday social, business, legal, and political 
interaction. Such motivational threats are constitutionally protected; 
“true threats” are not.200 
The court went on to note that unlike “true threats”—with their 
implicit reference to physical violence—many threats that cause 
 
 194. People v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341 (Ill. 2017). 
 195. Id. at 349 (construing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–7.3(a), (c) (West 2012)). 
 196. Id. at 353–54. 
 197. People v. Morocho, 132 N.E.3d 806, 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). 
 198. Id. at 810–11. 
 199. People v. Morocho, 132 N.E.3d 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). 
 200. Id. at 813 (emphasis in original). 
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emotional distress may in fact serve valuable social purposes like those 
protected by the communicative purpose of the First Amendment.201 It 
observed that “[t]hreats can be proper motivating tools” as in cases of 
coaches threatening players with benching if they do not play defense, 
parents threatening their children with no dessert, a lender or agent 
threatening foreclosure.202 “Under subsection (a)(2),” the court noted, 
“such threats, if construed to cause significant distress, anxiety, or 
alarm, carry felony criminal liability.”203 The court also noted that the 
statute could chill a core form of political speech, in the case of an 
activist “who decides not to attend a town hall meeting because 
repeatedly threatening to bring a polluting business owner’s operations 
to a halt with a boycott or injunction could result in arrest.”204 
The case law developing around the newer offenses of 
“cyberstalking” and “cyber-harassment”—intended to protect victims 
from online bullying—raises further concerns about the 
constitutionality of emotional harm–based stalking laws. For example, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court recently invalidated that state’s 
cyberstalking statute as facially invalid on overbreadth grounds.205 The 
statute prohibited “stalking” by “repeatedly mail[ing] or deliver[ing] 
or caus[ing] the delivery by any means, including electronically, of 
letters, telegrams, messages, packages . . . or any communication made 
through any available technologies or other objects,”206 and defined 
“stalking” as engaging  
in conduct which the actor knows or has reason to know would cause 
the victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, 
oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated, and causes this reaction on the 
part of the victim regardless of the relationship between the actor and 
victim.207 
The court struck down this statute as overbroad due to the lack of 
specific intent element and the fact that it covers “every type of 
communication without limitation.”208 In the same case, the court also 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 2019). 
 206. MINN. STAT. § 609.749(2)(6) (2019).  
 207. Id. § 609.749(1). 
 208. Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 849. 
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partially invalidated the more serious “cyberharassment” statute which 
made it a crime to “repeatedly mail[] or deliver[] or cause[] the delivery 
by any means, including electronically, of letters, telegrams, or 
packages,” even though that offense does require the specific intent to 
“abuse, disturb, or cause distress.”209 For that offense, the court severed 
“disturb” and “cause distress” as overbroad, thereby narrowing the 
mens rea element to “intent to abuse.” In so holding the court observed 
that acts of political speech such as “[d]elivering a letter that tells an 
elected official that the sender will take action to defeat him in the next 
election if he does not take action on gun control” could certainly be 
done with the intent to disturb and/or cause distress.210 The court 
concluded, therefore, that because such speech is clearly protected by 
the First Amendment, a law that criminalizes mailing or delivering a 
letter that disturbs or causes distress will have a substantial chilling 
effect on protected speech and expressive conduct.211 
To date, Illinois and Minnesota appear to be the only states in 
which courts have spoken so directly on the question of pure emotional 
distress as a basis for stalking liability. In the general absence of case 
law directly addressing the question and coming to the opposite 
conclusion, it would seem that a legislative effort to criminalize a 
pattern of conduct that reasonably results in emotional distress, in the 
absence of threats of violence, may be constitutionally suspect on 
overbreadth grounds, even when written precisely enough to survive a 
vagueness challenge. It would also seem that any effort to fashion a 
coercive control offense in the domestic context should try to avoid the 
overbreadth questions that arise when statutory text ties liability purely 
to the emotional reaction the conduct elicits from the victim.  
C. False Imprisonment 
In a well-argued student note, Alexandra Ortiz suggests a wholly 
different statutory framework as a means of adapting the U.K. coercive 
control offense to the American constitutional order.212 Ortiz uses the 
emphasis placed by Stark and other scholars of coercive control on the 
 
 209. MINN. STAT. § 609.795(1). 
 210. Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 862. Indeed, the court pointed out that the point of such 
speech is “often precisely to cause distress, strain, anxiety, or suffering in order to prompt action.” 
Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Ortiz, supra note 18, at 703. 
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extent to which it is an offense against the victim’s liberty to argue that 
the state of Tennessee should amend its false imprisonment offense to 
capture coercive control.213 Specifically, she argues that a revised false 
imprisonment crime might target such liberty-impinging behaviors as 
controlling a person’s movements, isolating them from friends and 
family, depriving them of basic needs or access to services, maintaining 
control over their assets, or otherwise—as suggested by the U.K. 
Statutory Guidance—“taking control over aspects of their everyday 
life, such as where they can go, who they can see, what to wear, and 
when they can sleep.”214 
Ortiz discusses the Tennessee Criminal Code’s provision that “[a] 
person commits the offense of false imprisonment who knowingly 
removes or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially 
with the other’s liberty.”215 She suggests that this definition be amended 
to prohibit “[a] course of conduct involving intentional, knowing, 
reckless, or negligent repeated or continuing harassment, intimidation, 
exploitation, humiliation, isolation, and/or control, directed toward a 
person with whom the perpetrator has a personal connection, which 
interferes substantially with that person’s liberty and autonomy.”216 
She defines “autonomy” as “the freedom to make personal decisions 
on a day-to-day basis” and notes that the word “substantially” ensures 
that the deprivation of liberty would not need to be so complete for the 
elements of the offense to be met.217 
It would seem that the language of this offense could potentially 
criminalize some of the same sorts of speech the Illinois and Minnesota 
Supreme Courts found to be constitutionally protected and, thus, 
overbroad. For example, one could imagine someone “negligently 
harassing” a person through purely communicative words and deeds in 
a way that interfered with that person’s autonomy, if the mechanism of 
the interference was the victim’s fear of causing displeasure. But the 
focus on the autonomy and liberty interests at stake in the false 
imprisonment offense is an improvement on the emotional distress–
based element of stalking offenses. 
 
 213. Id. at 703–04. 
 214. Id. at 704 (quoting HOME OFF., CONTROLLING OR COERCIVE BEHAVIOUR IN AN 
INTIMATE OR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP: STATUTORY GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK 4 (2015), https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/statutory-guidance-framework-controlling-or-coercive-
behaviour-in-an-intimate-or-family-relationship [https://perma.cc/P79V-ZD5A]). 
 215. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-302 (2017). 
 216. Ortiz, supra note 18, at 707–08. 
 217. Id. at 708. 
SHELEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
1364  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1321 
D. Blackmail 
Another pair of crimes that potentially punish coercive, expressive 
conduct are the related offenses of blackmail and extortion. In most 
jurisdictions “blackmail” is defined as “gaining or attempting to gain 
anything of value or compelling another to act against such person’s 
will, by threatening to communicate accusations or statements” that 
would subject the person to some form of embarrassment or public 
ridicule.218 “Extortion,” by contrast, is using the threat of future 
violence or some other unlawful act to extract something from a 
victim.219 Traditionally extortion involves the demand of property but 
may also involve a demand that the victim perform an act or refrain 
from performing an act he or she has the right to do. Some jurisdictions 
treat this latter category of act/omission-motivated extortion as the 
separate crime of “coercion.”220 Some states actually treat blackmail as 
a particular type of extortion, with the blackmailing conduct forming 
the unlawful act element.221 In general, traditional “extortion” offenses 
are legally noncontroversial insofar as the extortionist threatens 
consequences that are in and of themselves illegal.222 Blackmail, 
however, is unique insofar as—like the communications of the stalker 
who causes emotional distress as discussed in Part III.B or those of the 
hypothetical coercive controller who achieves his goal through words 
rather than blows—the blackmailer’s threatened communications 
might otherwise be a perfectly legal exercise of free speech. 
 
 218. See Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories of 
Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291, 308–
13 n.90 (2010) (surveying the variations between state definitions of blackmail). States vary on 
whether the offense of blackmail requires demands for property or includes demands that a victim 
engage in or refrain from action; whether it requires a threat to reveal information or whether it 
also extends to threats to perform other lawful but unwelcome acts; whether it contains no 
exceptions or permits the offense under specified circumstances; and whether “blackmail” is its 
own offense or a subset of more general offenses such as extortion, criminal “threats,” theft, 
larceny, or coercion. Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail Is So Hard To Resolve, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 590 (2012). 
 219. Robinson et al., supra note 218, at 293. 
 220. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275(1) (2017) (defining coercion as “compel[ling] or 
induc[ing] another person to engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right to 
abstain, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to 
engage”); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60 (Consol. 2020).  
 221. See Westen, supra note 218, at 590 (noting that some commentators use “threat” to refer 
to biconditionals in the context of extortion). 
 222. See Robinson et al., supra note 218, at 293 (defining extortion as an uncontroversial 
category of crime involving threats of criminal acts). 
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Commentators have therefore frequently described blackmail as 
“paradoxical,” as its official meaning is difficult to square with public 
intuitions about what sorts of conduct should be criminal.223 
Specifically, the paradox flows from the fact that blackmail punishes 
“the act of obtaining or attempting to obtain something of value from 
persons by offering in return to do something that is noncriminal (i.e., 
withhold incriminating or embarrassing information) under the threat 
of otherwise doing something that is also noncriminal (i.e., disclose 
information that can be lawfully commodified and sold for the actor’s 
personal gain).”224 Some scholars argue that, for this reason, blackmail 
should be treated identically to any other commercial transaction—
that “[b]oth parties gain from a voluntary trade, and this is as true of 
the exchange of money for silence as it is for any other case.”225 
Although this proposition is difficult to squarely refute as a logical 
matter, it has not been accepted by courts, which treat blackmail as an 
obvious exception to the free speech right.226 Furthermore, the 
theoretical unattractiveness of decriminalization is clear from the 
wealth of scholarly criticism attempting to provide a theoretical basis 
for criminalizing blackmail. The weight of consensus is that blackmail 
must be punished despite the very clear First Amendment problems 
with doing so. 
No less formidable proponents of the free market than legal 
scholars Richard Posner and Richard Epstein have rejected the 
legalization of blackmail on consequentialist grounds. Posner argues 
that, in situations in which the blackmailer reveals information that is 
already criminal or tortious it constitutes, essentially, either 
 
 223. See, e.g., Westen, supra note 218, at 585–86, 604 n.77 (describing and problematizing the 
“intuition” that extorted parties in blackmail are always moral victims rather than accomplices). 
 224. See id. at 595 (“[B]lackmail appears to consist of the very things that render commercial 
exchange noncriminal . . . .”); see also James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671 (1984) (“If both a person’s ends—seeking a job or money—and his 
means—threatening to expose—are otherwise legal, why is it illegal to combine them?”).  
 225. Walter Block & David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to 
Posner, Epstein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 37, 39 (1986). 
 226. See, e.g., Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 909 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases holding 
that the government “may proscribe threats, extortion, blackmail and the like,” notwithstanding 
“their expressive content”); United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting 
that speech, in particular threats, is “properly punished every day under statutes prohibiting 
extortion, blackmail and assault without consideration of First Amendment issues” (citing Watts 
v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1968))); United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 
(6th Cir. 1970) (“[S]peech is not protected . . . when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself.” 
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 871–877 (1964))). 
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overenforcement of the law or enforcement by the improper party.227 
In cases where the information is simply embarrassing, Posner asserts 
that blackmail is “the levying of a private tax on an activity that either 
is unlikely to be discouraged by the tax or that society has no interest 
in discouraging.”228 Epstein, while going so far as to acknowledge that 
legalizing blackmail could potentially create economic benefit through 
private enforcement of the criminal laws, warns that it would also 
create “an open and public market for a new set of social institutions 
to exploit the gains from this new form of legal activity.”229 These social 
institutions, which Epstein calls “Blackmail, Inc.,” would then become 
full-service firms that would also offer services to their own victims 
instructing them on how to best conceal whatever shameful secrets 
they may have from the other parties they affect.230 This, Epstein says, 
would create an entire undesirable industry premised on fraud and 
deceit.231  
Moral arguments for punishing blackmail are perhaps a bit easier 
to understand than consequentialist ones. Deontological theories 
capture the moral instinct that something about the choice a 
blackmailer forces on his victim constitutes an inherent wrong, 
susceptible to criminal punishment under retributive theories of 
justice. Professor Joel Feinberg claims that in cases in which either the 
unconditional act of keeping incriminating information secret or the 
unconditional act of revealing it is in and of itself a morally wrongful 
harm to a third party, the criminal law can legitimately be invoked to 
punish those who conditionally threaten or offer to commit either 
act.232 He bases this argument on philosopher John Stuart Mill’s harm 
 
 227. See Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1817, 1821–27 (1993) (arguing that blackmailers would contribute to overenforcement by acting 
as “private law enforcers” but would also “undermine optimal law enforcement”). 
 228. Id. at 1834. A particularly colorful example of the second form of inefficiency involves 
the potential blackmail of a victim who is sexually impotent and obtaining treatment from a sex 
therapist. “What would be the consequences if such blackmail were permitted?” Posner asks, and 
concludes “[n]ot less impotence, surely, but more. An impotent man would hesitate to seek 
professional assistance for fear of increasing the probability that blackmailers would discover his 
problem. The increase in impotence would generate (after subtracting the reduction in the use of 
therapists’ services) a net social cost.” Id. at 1833. 
 229. Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 562 (1983). 
 230. Id. at 564. 
 231. Id. at 565. 
 232. 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS 
WRONGDOING 239 (1990).   
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principle, which authorizes the law to restrict freedom only in cases 
where such freedom results in harm to others.233 Feinberg’s project, 
then, identifies which acts of revelation or concealment would in fact 
constitute moral harms.234 So, for example, either offering to conceal a 
crime or threatening to violate someone’s privacy by revealing 
embarrassing, noncriminal information about them, might form the 
basis for proper punishment consistent with the harm principle.235  
By contrast, Professor George Fletcher argues that it is not the 
disclosure or lack thereof itself that deontologically justifies punishing 
blackmail, but the consequences of the threat to disclose.236 Fletcher 
surveys ten disparate cases that would all constitute blackmail and 
notes that the offense represents, by turns and depending on the 
circumstances, “coercion of the victim, exploitation of the victim’s 
weakness, . . . trading unfairly in assets or chips that belong to others,” 
and “an undesirable and abusive form of private law enforcement.”237 
Further, the offense “leads to the waste of resources so far as 
blackmailers are induced to collect information that they are willing to 
suppress for a fee.”238 Yet he concludes that the one core wrong of 
blackmail, which can be identified across all potential cases, relates to 
the fact that blackmail is not a “one-shot affair.”239 Because a 
blackmailer can continue to subject his victim to repeated requests for 
more and more money—in the absence of an appropriate legal 
mechanism by which the victim can hold the blackmailer to his original 
bargain—blackmail creates an ongoing state of domination and 
subordination between the blackmailer and his victim.240 Fletcher 
argues that, because the criminal law is supposed to prevent precisely 
this relationship arising between private parties, not only is blackmail 
not anomalous but it is, in fact, a “paradigm” for understanding 
wrongdoing and criminal punishment generally.241  
 
 233. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) 
(1859).   
 234. Feinberg, supra note 232, at 239–58.  
 235. Id.  
 236. George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617, 1620 
(1993).  
 237.  Id. at 1637 (citations omitted). 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.   
 240. Id. at 1638. 
 241. Id. at 1617. 
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More recently, Professor Mitchell Berman has provided an 
“evidentiary” theory of blackmail, focusing on what the blackmailer’s 
overt act tells a fact-finder about his motivations.242 Berman argues that 
blackmail should be understood as a subset of extortion, rather than as 
a unique crime.243 Extortion, he asserts, may be criminally wrongful 
either due to the actus reus (in cases where what the extortionist 
threatens is in and of itself a crime) or due to the extortionist’s 
culpability (in cases where he has the purpose to, or certain knowledge 
that, his conduct will harm his victim).244 Berman concludes that 
blackmail falls into this second category, and that the action of 
threatening to reveal embarrassing information—even if legal in and 
of itself—may be evidence of the blackmailer’s intent to do harm and 
thus justify criminal liability.245 In an empirical study on lay intuitions 
about blackmail, Professors Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, and 
Daniel M. Bartels attempt to determine what the general public feels 
are the appropriate justifications for criminalizing the offense.246 They 
find support for Berman’s theory, concluding that “lay understandings 
of blackmail share the position that its gravamen involves harm to the 
recipient of the threat, rather than some third party or generalized 
social interest.”247 They also find that lay institutions do not attach any 
significance to the magnitude of a blackmailer’s demand or to the 
nature of the information the blackmailer threatens to disclose.248  
These deontological theories provide a potential justification for 
the criminalization of coercive control. Almost every moral 
justification for punishing the blackmailer would appear to apply 
similarly to the person who deliberately coerces his intimate partner 
over a sustained period of time in a manner that causes the victim 
significant harm, even if the coercive conduct is, like the blackmailer’s 
threatened revelation, based upon speech. Is it a morally wrongful 
 
 242. Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 797–98 (1998); Mitchell N. Berman, Meta-Blackmail and the Evidentiary 
Theory: Still Taking Motives Seriously, 94 GEO. L.J. 787, 789 (2006) [hereinafter Berman, Meta-
Blackmail].  
 243. See Berman, Meta-Blackmail, supra note 242, at 789–98.  
 244. Id. at 790. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See generally Robinson et al., supra note 218 (analyzing how competing theories align 
with the prevailing sentiment of blackmail).  
 247. Id. at 347. 
 248. Id. at 348. 
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harm, as Feinberg asks of blackmail, to restrict a domestic partner’s 
liberty in the same way that it is to violate someone’s privacy? If one 
looks at the harms of coercive control discussed in Part I, the answer 
would seem to be yes. At a minimum, it is no less vague to say that 
coercive control does a moral harm to the victim’s liberty interest than 
it is to say that blackmail does a moral harm to the victim’s privacy 
interest. Does coercive control create an ongoing state of “domina[nce] 
and subordination” analogous to the one Fletcher argues is the product 
of blackmail and, indeed, the paradigmatic purview of the criminal 
law?249 Almost by definition, yes—the very sociological meaning of 
domestic violence is “a pattern of behaviors used by one partner to 
maintain power and control over another partner in an intimate 
relationship,” which highlights the relationship between the habits of 
physical and nonphysical abuse and the purpose of creating sustained 
domination.250  
But does coercive control reflect the same culpability to the 
victim’s harm that Berman identifies as integral to all cases of 
blackmail? Here is one theory of blackmail by which the U.K. 
definition of coercive control may be too broad to be justified. Recall 
that in the U.K. offense the defendant’s mere negligence as to the 
“serious effect” his conduct has on his victim is enough to trigger 
liability; he is guilty if he “ought to know” of such an effect.251 If we 
accept Berman’s justification for blackmail—as Robinson and others 
suggest the general public may252—it reveals one area in which coercive 
control could profitably be narrowed to track with existing norms 
about criminally coercive speech. 
This quibble aside, it seems that blackmail—which, while 
conceptually “paradoxical,” is politically accepted and remains on the 
books in all fifty states—may guide an attempt to punish the similar 
offense of coercive control. The perpetrators of the two offenses 
possess similar intent—to extract something from their victims via 
coercive behavior that, while morally wrong, may not, in and of itself, 
be unlawful. Where the two offenses part ways is in the actus reus 
elements. Blackmail requires a particular quid pro quo—the 
perpetrator must threaten a particular revelation in exchange for a 
 
 249.   Fletcher, supra note 236, at 1626–29.  
 250. What Is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (May 14, 2017), 
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined [https://perma.cc/W5CN-HTFW].  
 251. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).  
 252. See Robinson et al., supra note 218, at 347. 
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particular concession from the victim. If one agrees with Fletcher’s 
“subordination” view of blackmail, one could argue that the true 
criminal harm of blackmail lies not in that particular quid pro quo but 
in the ongoing enterprise of coercion that arises from the initial 
transaction. Nonetheless, it is clear that the nature of the conduct 
prohibited by blackmail statutes is far more precisely defined than the 
open-ended language of the U.K. coercive control statute. But this 
would seem to be a vagueness problem that could be resolved through 
more precise drafting, not a First Amendment ground for 
distinguishing between the two doctrines. Blackmail punishes purely 
and inherently communicative conduct—namely, the threat to make a 
revelation. 
Despite blackmail’s attractiveness as an analog for a legislature 
trying to fashion a coercive control offense that could survive 
constitutional challenges, the need to draft a sufficiently narrow actus 
reus would not be the only problem drafters would face. At least some 
courts have cited the historical pedigree of blackmail as a distinct crime 
at common law as a basis for approving its punishment of otherwise 
legal speech. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in asserting that “[w]ords 
often are the sole means of committing crime—think bribery, perjury, 
blackmail, fraud” and that “the First Amendment does not disable 
governments from punishing these language-based crimes” noted that 
many of these crimes “pre-dated the First Amendment.”253 The 
Oregon Supreme Court, in the process of holding the state’s then-
existing coercion statute unconstitutional on First Amendment 
grounds, despite the fact that it criminalized illegal threats, noted that 
“[j]udicial and academic analyses of the principles governing freedom 
to make demands coupled with threats have been sparse and 
inconclusive.”254 However, the court took care to distinguish the 
seemingly more problematic crime of blackmail, stating it had “no 
doubt” that blackmail statutes would survive free speech challenges on 
“historic grounds alone.”255 Needless to say, a coercive control offense 
would not likely enjoy such historically justified constitutional 
exceptionalism.  
 
 253. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 254. State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 580 (Or. 1982). The redrafted version of the 
statute passed constitutional muster provided that the “fear” felt by the victim is objectively 
reasonable, the physical injury that is feared is objectively reasonable, and the “some person” to 
whom injury is threatened is a specific person. State v. Stone, 735 P.2d 7, 9 (Or. Ct. App.).  
 255. Robertson, 649 P.2d at 581. 
SHELEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
2021] CRIMINALIZING COERCIVE CONTROL 1371 
E. Criminal Conspiracy 
It may seem counterintuitive to seek doctrinal insights about an 
offense as intimate as coercive control from the jurisprudence on group 
liability. At first blush, the two fields might be thought to occupy 
theoretically polar ends of criminal liability. But the law of criminal 
conspiracy poses structural challenges surprisingly similar to those of 
coercive control. As scholar Albert Harno once observed: 
  In the long category of crimes there is none . . . more difficult to 
confine within the boundaries of definitive statement than conspiracy. 
It covers the field of crimes and makes unlawful agreements among 
individuals to commit any crime; it extends to agreements to commit 
at least some torts and some breaches of contract, and, finally, it 
shades into the horizon with agreements to do acts, which, though not 
unlawful when done by the parties separately, may, nevertheless, 
become unlawful ends for those who agree to commit them.256 
The crime of conspiracy at common law resembles coercive control 
insofar as it may capture otherwise noncriminal conduct due primarily 
to the harms posed by the situational and sociological structure in 
which the conduct occurs. 
The common law rule that it can be criminal merely to agree to 
commit an unlawful act, even with no evidence of an attempt to execute 
it, dates all the way back to the 1611 Poulterers’ Case,257 decided by the 
Star Chamber and eventually followed by common law courts after the 
Restoration.258 As Justice John Willes put it in the nineteenth century, 
“[s]o long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable” 
but “[w]hen two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in 
itself, and the act of each of the parties . . . punishable if for a criminal 
object or for the use of criminal means.”259 Just as a lawful agreement 
between two parties would be enforceable against them, an unlawful 
agreement may serve as the basis for criminal sanction.  
The justifications for criminalizing conspiracy as a distinct, 
inchoate crime are familiar and somewhat controversial. The lesser 
rationale is one of expedience. Conspiracy has been said to “fill the gap 
 
 256. Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 624 (1940–41) 
(citations omitted). 
 257. The Poulterers’ Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (KB).  
 258. Harno, supra note 256, at 628.  
 259. Mulcahy v. The Queen, L. R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 306, 317 (1868) (emphasis added).  
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created by a law of attempt too narrowly conceived”; it allows law 
enforcement to arrest perpetrators before they have proceeded so far 
in their plans as to have taken that dangerous “substantial step” toward 
commission of the offense itself.260 The greater rationale “lies in the 
fact—or at least the assumption—that collective action toward an 
antisocial end involves a greater risk to society than individual action 
toward the same end.”261 As the Supreme Court has articulated it, 
“[c]oncerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal 
object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that 
the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.”262 
In other words, sharing a criminal intent with at least one other party 
increases the odds of it being executed to an extent that agreement 
alone—even without a substantial step toward its completion263—
suffices as an actus reus to support a criminal conviction.  
Some psychological literature appears to support this second 
justification. As Professor Neal Katyal summarizes it, “it is generally 
accepted that groups are more likely to polarize toward extremes, to 
take courses of action that advance the interests of the group even in 
the face of personal doubts, and to act with greater loyalty to each 
other.”264 Other scholars disagree on the merits as to the alleged 
dangerousness of groups. As Professor Abraham Goldstein argues, 
including multiple participants in a criminal scheme could in fact 
increase the risk that someone will leak the plan or result in the 
participants sharing uncertainties and dissuading one another from 
proceeding.265  
Despite such objections, these two rationales for criminal 
conspiracy have carried the day to date. The law assumes both that 
conspiracy is a necessary tool for overcoming evidentiary obstacles to 
targeting certain forms of individual harm and that group intent poses 
 
 260. See Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 1122, 1122 n.5, 1154 (1975). 
 261. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 923–24 (1959). 
 262. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961). 
 263. The Model Penal Code changes the common law rule and makes an “overt act” an 
element of conspiracy. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (AM. L. INST. 1985). States have followed 
the code to varying degrees, some requiring a substantial step in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
while others adhering to the common law rule and rejecting such a requirement. See Matthew 
Ladew, Speaking Louder than Words: Finding an Overt Act Requirement in the Hobbs Act, 28 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 72 (2018). 
 264. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1316 (2003). 
 265. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414 
(1959). 
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a unique danger requiring a unique remedy in the substantive criminal 
law. Although, of course, the offense of conspiracy requires intent to 
commit a crime, mere intent to commit a crime is not itself a crime. 
Conspiracy criminalizes communicated intent, even without the clear 
and present danger generally required to meet the true threats 
exception to the First Amendment. The twin justifications for this 
seeming anomaly track surprisingly closely with the justifications for 
the coercive control offense urged by its U.K. proponents. Remember 
the two harms coercive control causes: the direct physical and 
psychological harms and the future violent harms predicted by coercive 
control. Conspiracy has survived for four centuries despite its tensions 
with traditional principles of criminality on very similar reasoning.  
First, it is easier to redress the direct harms of crime if an event—
in this case, the conspiratorial agreement—can be criminalized that 
occurs chronologically earlier than the “overt act” of which the crime 
of attempt requires evidence. This claim is analogous to the assertion 
that an offense is needed that can more easily capture the complex 
interrelation between all forms of control—physical and mental—
rather than the “transactional” episodes of physical violence that form 
the primary basis for prosecution under existing law. Conspiracy does 
what coercive control seeks to do: removes evidentiary obstacles to 
targeting a well-known set of harms that are hard to prove on an 
individual basis. 
Second, both conspiracy and coercive control seek to punish a 
heightened risk of danger, premised on context. Judicial intuition and 
empirical literature alike suggest that groups are dangerous—that what 
might remain merely a nasty thought if held by a single actor is more 
likely to manifest in the real world once it becomes the basis of an 
agreement with another party. Similarly, individual acts of controlling 
conduct toward a domestic relation become dangerous when they form 
a part of a broader coercive pattern. Sociology reveals the violence 
predicted by coercive control patterns, which in turn, provides the 
justification for turning something that would otherwise be a perfectly 
lawful incident of discord within a marriage into a crime. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the fundamental similarities in 
justification, conspiracy law’s punishment of mere agreement creates 
several problems of legality, which quite closely parallel those 
previously discussed as potentially plaguing a coercive control offense. 
The Supreme Court has set very loose requirements for what due 
process requires the prosecution to show in order to prove the actus 
reus element of “agreement.” The Court has stated that “the 
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agreement need not be shown to have been explicit. It can instead be 
inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.”266 Courts have 
construed this to mean that a “mere tacit understanding will suffice, 
and there need not be any written statement or even a speaking of 
words which expressly communicates agreement.”267  
Professor Laurent Sacharoff has pointed out the vagueness 
problems inherent in this formulation.268 As Sacharoff notes, 
“agreement” can mean something as legally specific as a contract—
with an exchange of promises and obligation of performance—or it can 
refer to merely shared opinion—“as when we say, ‘experts agree 
smoking causes cancer.’”269 He asserts that the familiar principle that 
the agreement is the actus reus has devolved in practice into an 
effective trial rule where a person becomes guilty of conspiracy merely 
“for proximity to criminal activity.”270 He proposes that, to prove the 
agreement element of conspiracy, a prosecutor should have to prove 
an exchange of promises to commit a crime, which he suggests would 
create an obligation among the parties to follow through with the 
crime.271  
Furthermore, the criminalization of mere agreement poses, 
similarly to a coercive control offense, potential First Amendment 
issues. Professor Martin Redish and then-law student Michael Downey 
argue that, to the extent that parties form agreements through speech 
unaccompanied by overt acts, they may be eligible for constitutional 
protection.272 They note that under the controlling clear-and-present-
danger test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio,273 speech openly 
advocating criminal conduct may be constitutionally suppressed only 
when “such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”274 They 
argue that no principled distinction between criminal incitement and 
criminal conspiracy exists and that, therefore, the First Amendment 
 
 266. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975).  
 267. See, e.g., State v. Mapp, 585 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1998). 
 268. Laurent Sacharoff, Conspiracy as Contract, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 407–08 (2016).   
 269. Id. at 408. 
 270. Id. at 410. 
 271. Id. at 410–11. 
 272. Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76 
ALB. L. REV. 697, 699 (2012). 
 273. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 274. Redish & Downey, supra note 272, at 730 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48). 
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requires “proof of overt, non-expressive acts intertwined with the 
expression involved in [forming a] conspiracy.”275 
The coercive control offense shares yet another important 
structural feature with the crime of conspiracy. Beyond its substitution 
of mere agreement for actus reus, common law conspiracy is, as Harno 
notes, also unusual in the sorts of agreements it criminalizes. The 
common law defined conspiracy as an agreement “either to do an 
unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means.”276 Early 
commentators argued over the meaning of “unlawful” in this context, 
including nineteenth-century treatise writer James Fitzjames Stephen. 
Stephen notes how, in some cases, “an agreement to do an unlawful act 
was held to mean something more than an agreement to do an act 
which is in itself criminal when done by a single person” because the 
courts used the word “unlawful” “in a sense closely approaching to 
immoral simply, and amounting at least to immoral and at the same 
time injurious to the public.”277 English courts at this time therefore 
criminalized conspiracies to commit “immoral” acts, such as falsely 
accusing a person of fathering a bastard, indenturing a girl at 
prostitution, marrying off a pauper so as to charge another parish with 
his support, raising workmen’s wages, committing civil trespass, and 
combining to “defraud” the government through otherwise 
noncriminal means.278  
The modern American definition of conspiracy is, depending on 
jurisdiction, the creature of either statute or common law and therefore 
widely variable. Most states now require that the object of a conspiracy 
be itself a crime.279 Yet Stephen’s understanding of “unlawful” as far 
broader than “criminal” remains on the books in some states today. 
Courts in those state may construe “unlawful means” to include 
conspiracies to commit noncriminal acts that are nonetheless injurious 
to the public health or morals or to trade or commerce, or that may 
 
 275. Id. at 732. 
 276. See, e.g., R v. Jones (1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (KB).  
 277. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 229 
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883).  
 278. 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 393–94 (3d ed. 2018) (citations 
omitted). 
 279. Id. at 395. 
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result in the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due 
administration of the laws.280  
For example, in State v. Blackledge,281 the Supreme Court of Iowa 
upheld the criminal conviction of the defendants—officers in a 
workmen’s organization—for conspiracy to injure the property and 
funds of that organization by loaning its funds out for a fee in violation 
of a civil provision of the Iowa Code.282 On appeal, one of the 
defendants objected that the indictment below was insufficient because 
it had failed to allege that he had committed any acts that were 
themselves felonious.283 Though acknowledging a conflict in Iowa case 
law on this subject, the court cited its own prior conspiracy decisions 
that, “in referring to the [unlawful means requirement], have used the 
words ‘illegal’ and ‘unlawful’ interchangeably and obviously without 
intending thereby to imply a crime.”284 It therefore held that the 
defendants’ conviction for criminal conspiracy was proper because 
“[t]he means charged in the indictment . . . were unlawful and illegal” 
and “[a]lthough not criminal, the intent of the defendants named was 
to unlawfully obtain from the society named funds belonging thereto 
and to its certificate and policy holders.”285 
Some state criminal codes contain conspiracy provisions explicitly 
worded to include noncriminal conduct, such as the California Penal 
Code which states: “[t]wo or more persons [may not] conspire . . . [t]o 
commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to 
pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws.”286 
 
 280. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 158 A. 797, 799 (Conn. 1932) (“A conspiracy will be indictable, 
if the end proposed or the means to be employed are, by reason of the combination, particularly 
dangerous to the public interests, or particularly injurious to some individual, although not 
criminal.” (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 63 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Ky. 1933) (noting 
that an agreement may be indicted under the common law of criminal conspiracy if its objectives 
“have a tendency to injure the public, to violate public policy, or to injure, oppress, or wrongfully 
prejudice individuals collectively or the public generally” (citations omitted)); State v. Burnham, 
15 N.H. 396, 403 (1844) (“When it is said . . . that the means must be unlawful, it is not to be 
understood that those means must amount to indictable offenses, in order to make the offence of 
conspiracy complete. It will be enough if they are corrupt, dishonest, fraudulent, immoral, and in 
that sense illegal.” (citation omitted)). But see People v. Redd, 228 Cal. App. 4th 449, 463–64 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2014).  
 281. State v. Blackledge, 243 N.W. 534 (Iowa 1932). 
 282. Id. at 535. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 535, 537. 
 285. Id.  
 286. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(a)(5) (West 2011). 
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Furthermore, some states also retain fraud statutes that base criminal 
liability on the “unlawful means” of defrauding—the conspiratorial 
element—without defining the fraud itself as a crime in its own right if 
committed by an individual.287 
That said, this approach has been heavily criticized. In considering 
a 1948 appeal of conviction under a Utah statute criminalizing 
“conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals” the Supreme 
Court deferred to the statutory interpretation of the Utah Supreme 
Court, but warned that such provisions may run afoul of the vagueness 
and overbreadth prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
It is obvious that this is no narrowly drawn statute. We do not 
presume to give an interpretation as to what it may include. Standing 
by itself, it would seem to be warrant for conviction for agreement to 
do almost any act which a judge and jury might find at the moment 
contrary to his or its notions of what was good for health, morals, 
trade, commerce, justice or order. In some States the phrase 
“injurious to public morals” would be likely to punish acts which it 
would not punish in others because of the varying policies on such 
matters as use of cigarettes or liquor and the permissibility of 
gambling.288 
In his seminal treatise on substantive criminal law, Professor 
Wayne LaFave notes the extent to which state courts have ignored this 
warning and continued to uphold such conspiracy statutes289 but urges, 
nonetheless, that the statutes fail to provide sufficient notice of what 
conduct is criminal.290 He argues that if broad conspiracy provisions 
 
 287. See, e.g., id. § 182(a)(4) (making it an offense to “defraud any person,” but by “means . . .  
themselves criminal”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-1(1)(d) (West 2020) (making it an offense “to 
defraud another out of property by any means which are in themselves criminal” or “would 
amount to a cheat”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 421 (West 2020) (same). Some states use the 
same approach to criminalizing conspiracy to defraud the government. See, e.g., IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 425.13 (West 2020) (criminalizing fraud in obtaining homestead tax credits); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 752.1005 (West 2020) (criminalizing fraud in obtaining health care benefits); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 43-13-211 (fraud regarding Medicaid benefits), id. § 97-7-15 (criminalizing fraud in 
other specified ways); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 424; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-8 (2020) 
(criminalizing defrauding the state for any purpose); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-6 (West 2020) 
(criminalizing a false claim for medical benefits); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-10-31 (West 2020) 
(criminalizing defrauding the state for any purpose). 
 288. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 96–97 (1948). 
 289. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Sup. Ct., 291 P.2d 474, 482 (Cal. 1955); Lorenson v. Sup. Ct., 216 
P.2d 859, 866 (Cal. 1950); People v. Sullivan, 248 P.2d 520, 528 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); State v. 
Nielsen, 426 P.2d 13, 16 (Utah 1967). 
 290. LAFAVE, supra note 278, at 395 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (AM. L. INST. 1985)). 
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make it easier to reach, through group liability, harmful conduct for 
which it is difficult to penalize individuals, then the solution is to reform 
the substantive criminal law in those areas.291 Alternatively, he argues 
that if some activities should indeed only be criminal if engaged in by 
groups then special conspiracy provisions must be no less precise than 
any other penal provisions.292  
To summarize, the offense of conspiracy emerged from a similar 
set of theoretical motivations as the offense of coercive control and has 
created a similar range of theoretical problems. Both may provide 
useful insights should state legislatures seek to follow the United 
Kingdom’s lead and recognize coercive control as a criminal offense. 
Remember that under the U.K. statute, to be guilty of coercive control 
a defendant must repeatedly or continuously engage in behavior that is 
controlling or coercive, that behavior must have a serious effect on the 
victim, and the defendant either must know in fact or ought to know of 
this serious effect. The actus reus requirement of “repeated and 
continuous” behavior functions doctrinally similarly to the long-
accepted actus reus of “agreement” in conspiracy law: it transforms 
thought that would be purely private into a public danger appropriate 
for criminalization. 
The scholarly criticisms of conspiracy’s legality problems may also 
inform any legislative attempt to refine the U.K. statute into an offense 
that could pass constitutional scrutiny in the United States. In the first 
place, the word “behavior” suffers from many of the same vagueness 
and First Amendment problems as “agreement.” To avoid First 
Amendment issues, legislatures could substitute for “behavior” a list 
of conduct including “actions” and other forms of constitutionally 
unprotected speech: certainly “threats” of violence, but also false and 
fraudulent speech and coercive speech of the sort typically punished by 
blackmail statutes. To avoid vagueness problems legislatures could 
adopt a mens rea requirement that the behavioral actus reus be 
accompanied by a specific intent to assert long-term, nontrivial control 
over the victim’s liberty.  
Such revisions would still mean that the offense of coercive control 
covered conduct that was not in and of itself criminal. In that respect it 
would remain open to the sorts of objections levied at the “unlawful 
means” theory of criminal conspiracy. Unless, of course, the nature of 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
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the actus reus of coercive control is reconceptualized, which will be the 
task of the next subsection. 
F. Fraud 
“Force” and “fraud” are frequently recognized as the two 
traditional bases for criminal liability.293 Deontological theories of 
criminal punishment explain why: physical coercion and dishonesty are 
widely perceived to be immoral violations of the rights of others.294 
Even economic theory supports the criminalization of these two 
categories of conduct because “[f]orce and artifice are inherently 
coercive behaviors, unresponsive to the market mechanisms that put 
exchange prices on what people want to achieve.”295 In the economic 
view, fraud is wrong because it allows the perpetrator to gain an off-
market advantage that the market itself cannot punish.296 Most of the 
crimes discussed so far as in some way similar to coercive control create 
the possibility of force (stalking, conspiracy, depending on the 
predicate offense) or at least coercion (blackmail). Yet criminal fraud 
jurisprudence is relevant as well. Like coercive control, fraud is 
famously difficult to define precisely, often requiring an exercise of 
purely moral intuition to identify.297 It therefore presents similar 
problems as coercive control for legislators trying to decide exactly 
 
 293. Epstein, supra note 229, at 556. 
 294. Epstein notes that:  
The moral stand against force and fraud provides a powerful theory to generate the 
standard set of criminal offenses: larceny, taking by false pretenses, and embezzlement 
all presuppose that we have (and we do have) a clear sense of who owns what before 
the transaction in question takes place; with that settled, given transactions are 
characterized as criminal not by some haphazard formula, but because they conform to 
the implicit pattern of entitlements and their violations outlined above. 
Id. at 556–57.  Jayme Herschkopf similarly notes that: 
Fraud, at its core, is a type of deception, and it is that deception that encapsulates 
fraud’s immorality. To deceive is to infringe on another’s autonomy: to willfully alter 
another’s mental processes by skewing the truth. Whether the deception leads to 
material harm is irrelevant from a deontological point of view; the deception itself is 
the wrong committed.  
Jayme Herschkopf, Morality and Securities Fraud, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 453, 465 (2017) (citations 
omitted). 
 295. Alex Stein, Corrupt Intentions: Bribery, Unlawful Gratuity, and Honest Services Fraud, 
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61 (2012). 
 296. Id. 
 297. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941) (“[T]he law does not 
define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity.”). 
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where unethical dealings between two private actors should cross the 
line into criminality.  
Fraud is commonly defined as the intentional misrepresentation 
of a material existing fact made by one person to another with 
knowledge of its falsity and for the purpose of inducing the other 
person to act, and upon which the other person relies with resulting 
injury or damage.298 That said, the precise content and existence of each 
of these elements varies substantially by jurisdiction, by substantive 
legal context, and according to jurisprudential gloss.299 At common law, 
fraud between private parties was traditionally a civil concept, leaving 
only frauds against the public to be punished criminally.300 Even civil 
law once primarily left transacting parties to their own devices until the 
increasing complexity of the commercial age saw a demand for legal 
intervention to protect vulnerable consumers from the ever-more 
creative predations of their corporate counterparties.301 In our current 
era, a wide range of state and, in particular, federal laws impose not 
only civil but criminal liability for various forms of fraud.302 Laws like 
the federal mail303 and wire fraud304 statutes may speak generally to 
fraud across a wide range of circumstances; others may focus on 
particular contexts such as securities fraud,305 health care fraud,306 or 
banking fraud.307  
Though the traditional understanding of fraud involves elements 
of both intentional deceit and resulting harm to the victim, its “moral 
dimension”—the justification for moving it into the criminal law as 
opposed to the purely compensatory realm of tort law—comes from its 
mental component, scienter.308 Scienter—defined as the “fraudulent 
intent” or “intent to deceive”—is not always a requirement in civil 
 
 298. See 1 EDWARD J. DEVITT, CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, MICHAEL A. WOLFF & KEVIN F. 
O’MALLEY, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 583 (4th ed. 1992) (defining “fraud” 
and “fraudulent”). 
 299. Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 738–39 (1999). 
 300. Id. at 736. 
 301. Herschkopf, supra note 294, at 465. 
 302. Podgor, supra note 299, at 737. 
 303. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). 
 304. Id. § 1343. 
 305. Id. § 1348. 
 306. Id. § 1347. 
 307. Id. § 1344. 
 308. Herschkopf, supra note 294, at 458. 
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fraud cases but typically is in criminal actions.309 For example, the 
government must be able to show at least “willfulness” to convert a 
civil violation of the securities laws into a criminal one.310 As the 
Supreme Court put it recently in a case about bankruptcy fraud: 
“Actual fraud” has two parts: actual and fraud. The word “actual” has 
a simple meaning in the context of common-law fraud: It denotes any 
fraud that “involv[es] moral turpitude or intentional wrong.” 
“Actual” fraud stands in contrast to “implied” fraud or fraud “in law,” 
which describe acts of deception that “may exist without the 
imputation of bad faith or immorality.” Thus, anything that counts as 
“fraud” and is done with wrongful intent is “actual fraud.”311 
In other words, under the common law understanding the actor’s intent 
in performing an act of deception has a separate legal existence and 
effect above and beyond the act of deception itself. 
Taking this basic structure of fraud law as a guide, we can make 
some general observations about an attempt to criminalize coercive 
control. First off, the criminal law may properly address itself to the 
harm imposed on one party by another in a superior power relation. 
As Professor Alex Stein notes, the essence of fraud is coercion;312 if 
coercion through deceit requires intervention by the state at some 
point it stands to reason that other forms of nonphysical, nonpecuniary 
coercion may as well. Second, all forms of coercive dealings—
fraudulent or otherwise—may vary in severity and therefore create 
shades of gray for lawmakers trying to determine where criminal 
liability should attach. Just as the criminal law does not punish all acts 
of deception as criminal fraud in the absence of scienter, it may not be 
appropriate for criminal coercive control to include, as the U.K. statute 
does, inadvertent conduct even if unreasonable. 
On the flip side, criminal fraud itself presents a host of conceptual 
and enforcement problems that also find analogs in the coercive 
control context. In particular, the expansive theories of fraud justifying 
 
 309. Id. at 458, 472. 
 310. See Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2018) (requiring a person to “willfully” 
violate); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (same); Investment 
Company Act of 1940 § 49, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (same); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 217, 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-17 (same). 
 311. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2016) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878)). 
 312. Stein, supra note 295, at 61. 
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most prosecutions under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes draw 
a great deal of critical fire for allowing too much room for prosecutorial 
abuse and excessive discretion.313 In the 1940s, courts began to 
interpret the potential object of a criminal “scheme or artifice to 
defraud” under those statutes to include not only money or property 
but the “intangible rights” to such goods as intellectual property314 and 
the honest services of government employees, free from the influence 
of unlawful gratuities.315 Eventually, the Supreme Court rejected the 
theory of “honest services” fraud,316 but Congress restored it with 18 
U.S.C. § 1346, which clarifies that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, 
the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to 
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”317  
This statutory fix, however, left unresolved a number of 
conceptual problems that have troubled courts, litigants, and 
commentators in the years since. First off, it appears that the 
“intangible right of honest services” includes the right to receive honest 
services from private actors, and not merely public employees.318 This 
raises the question of whether, to form the basis for a private-sector 
honest services fraud action, the deprivation of honest services must 
involve the violation of a fiduciary duty. In United States v. 
Milovanovic,319 the Ninth Circuit held that a breach of fiduciary duty is 
indeed a required element of private-sector honest services fraud, but 
that such a duty is not “limited to a formal ‘fiduciary’ relationship well-
known in the law” and may include relationships in which “one party 
acts for the benefit of another and induces the trusting party to relax 
the care and vigilance which it would ordinarily exercise.”320 The rule 
that certain relationships give rise to obligations of fair dealing, 
particularly where the nature of the relationship induces trust on the 
 
 313. The statutes’ perceived expansiveness and potential for abuse has given rise to the 
facetious expression, “when in doubt, charge mail fraud.” John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: 
Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between 
Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 126 (1981). 
 314. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987). 
 315. Shusan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941). 
 316. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987). 
 317. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018). 
 318. See, e.g., United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 367–68 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming the honest 
services fraud conviction of university professors for allowing students to plagiarize work and 
receive degrees on that basis). 
 319. United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 320. Id. at 724. 
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part of the victim, is similar to the idea that intimate relationships 
create other sorts of trust, the exploitation of which could be in the 
purview of criminal law. Nonetheless, legislators drafting a coercive 
control offense should avoid the ambiguity caused by Congress’s 
decision in § 1346 not to be clear about the particular private-sector 
relationships that might trigger a right to “honest services.” 
One question the Supreme Court has answered as to the scope of 
honest services fraud is the nature of the “scheme to defraud” 
necessary for liability to attach. As discussed earlier in this Article, 
Skilling v. United States321 held that mere “self-dealing” by private 
actors—such as former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, whose securities 
fraud was motivated in part by his interest in receiving gigantic 
bonuses—was insufficient to support an honest services fraud 
conviction.322 In considering Skilling’s vagueness challenge the Court 
explicitly limited private-sector honest services fraud to cases 
specifically involving bribery or kickbacks, which it described as 
forming the “core of the pre-McNally case law.”323 Congress, of course, 
would have been free to define the range of contemplated schemes to 
defraud however it chose. But Skilling shows how a generally worded 
prohibition on a “scheme to coerce” would likely fail vagueness 
scrutiny. At least in the context of fraud, background common law 
indicates that certain types of conduct—bribery and kickbacks—fell 
squarely into the category of honest services fraud Congress sought to 
codify at § 1346. In the absence of such pre-statutory case law on 
coercive control, it seems unlikely that a similarly worded coercive 
control statute would survive even in part on the logic of Skilling. 
Another illuminating open question in private-sector honest 
services fraud jurisprudence is whether the government must prove 
that the victim faced any risk of economic harm or that such harm was 
foreseeable to the defendant. Circuits are currently split. The majority 
rule, followed by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, 
is that a breach of fiduciary duty must cause a risk of reasonably 
foreseeable harm.324 The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, however, 
 
 321. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 322. Id. at 368. 
 323. Id. at 409. 
 324. See, e.g., United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 17 (lst Cir. 2000); United States v. Devetger, 198 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 
1327, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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follow the so-called “materiality standard,” which requires only that 
the government prove the deceitful employee “has reason to believe 
the information [hidden] would lead a reasonable employer to change 
its business conduct.”325 To avoid a near-identical problem of 
construction, a coercive control offense would need to be clear about 
whether the government would be required to prove an objective risk 
of harm to the victim, or whether it would be enough to show that the 
perpetrator had reason to believe his conduct was likely to change his 
victim’s conduct in some way. Either way, to the extent that honest 
services fraud requires, at most, only a risk of injury to the victim, it is 
a better model for coercive control than the emotional injury-based 
theories of child and elder abuse discussed in Part III.A, with their 
bedeviling problems of proof. For the same reasons it is an 
improvement on the “serious effect” element of the U.K. coercive 
control statute.  
Beyond the particular doctrinal puzzles of honest services fraud, a 
look at how courts generally apply fraud offenses in practice provides 
a final set of insights into how a coercive control offense might play 
out. As Professor Samuel Buell notes, the difficulty in defining fraud 
lies precisely in determining the optimal level of specificity as to 
prohibited conduct.326 Defined too broadly, the offense may fail to 
adequately clarify what behavior is actually criminal.327 Defined too 
narrowly, however, the law may fail to anticipate and keep up with the 
endless creativity of commercial actors who excel at devising new ways 
to achieve arguably fraudulent results while narrowly remaining on the 
right side of existing law.328 The preceding sections have demonstrated 
how any attempt to draft a coercive control offense presents a similar 
Scylla and Charybdis. 
To resolve this problem in fraud cases, Buell observes, courts and 
enforcement actors appear to apply a post hoc methodology for 
determining whether to punish an actor pursuing truly “novel” 
deceptive conduct that does not clearly violate existing fraud 
prohibitions.329 He asserts that such actors get convicted when the 
 
 325. United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 1981); accord United States v. Brown, 
459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en 
banc); United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 326. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1973–74, 1980 (2006).  
 327. Id. at 1981. 
 328. Id. at 1973–74. 
 329. Id. at 1971. 
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government can present evidence of “consciousness of wrongdoing”—
for example, “badges of guilt” such as concealment—accompanying 
their behavior.330 Buell concludes that this post hoc sorting avoids some 
of the problems inherent in devising more precise conduct rules and 
can be justified on the basis that an actor who pursues deceptive 
behavior “in the face of actual knowledge that prevailing norms reject 
that behavior” is “equivalently blameworthy to an actor who 
intentionally pursues a course of conduct that the law has previously 
described as fraud.”331  
Buell’s argument is useful to this Article’s discussion of coercive 
control for two reasons. In the first place, he gives reason to believe 
that the adjudication process itself provides an ex post limitation on 
which sorts of ambiguous conduct actually get punished for violating a 
somewhat generally worded intent-based offense. His account of how 
courts have cabined fraud suggests that even if a coercive control 
offense contained somewhat broad conduct rules, there may be reason 
to expect courts to serve a sorting function by only allowing cases to 
proceed where the evidence suggests the defendant had awareness of 
the wrongfulness of his conduct. The counterargument, of course, is 
that “novel” fraud cases arise against the backdrop of a well-
established common law offense, and we could not expect a brand-new 
crime like coercive control to be enforced in such a principled way on 
a case-by-case basis. Even accepting that objection, however, Buell’s 
work urges thought about the importance of “consciousness of guilt” 
as an ex ante element of the offense. His conclusions demonstrate that 
the scienter element adds predictability to the treatment of evidence in 
a potentially chaotic area of the law. The lack of such a requirement in 
the U.K. coercive control offense is, therefore, one of its most 
significant problems. 
IV.  TOWARD A COERCIVE CONTROL OFFENSE 
This survey of offenses with similar structures, purposes, and 
legality problems as coercive control provides a foundation for 
legislatures to use in drafting a statute with the same policy goals as the 
U.K. version, without creating an unconstitutional anomaly under 
American law. It now remains to offer model statutory language that 
is logically consistent with the legal justifications for the familiar 
 
 330. Id. at 1999–2000.  
 331. Id. at 1971, 2022–31. 
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offenses discussed. After first presenting the model offense, this Part 
will consider the evidentiary and policy objections that may still urge 
against its adoption. 
A. The Elements of the Offense 
The following proposal improves upon the U.K. coercive control 
offense by adopting a structure roughly similar to the crime of 
conspiracy to commit fraud. Although this may seem like a 
counterintuitive point of departure, conspiracy and fraud 
jurisprudence, examined together, help resolve some of the 
overbreadth and vagueness problems inherent in drafting a 
nontransactional, coercive offense that encompasses nonviolent 
interactions between two private parties.  
Fraudulent speech itself is punishable because speech intrinsic to 
committing the elements of an existing crime is not constitutionally 
protected.332 Part III.D explained how even despite this general 
principle blackmail has been the subject of significant critical debate 
due to the fact that it appears to be a crime comprising solely legal 
speech (for example, a verbal threat to make a verbal revelation). 
Professor Stephen Galoob has defended blackmail on the unique 
grounds that it functions as a kind of fraud.333 Each blackmail, he points 
out, consists of two parts: the initial threat, which is coercive, and the 
subsequent agreement.334 The agreement, he argues, is actually 
fraudulent because it is unenforceable. According to Galoob, “Proving 
criminal law charges of fraud usually requires showing that the 
defendant has deceived the target, but deception matters mainly in 
virtue of its connection to value.”335 Because the blackmailer’s 
agreement not to reveal the information after being paid is 
unenforceable, the victim of blackmail has entered into a valueless, and 
thus fraudulent, exchange.336 
Galoob’s account of blackmail illuminates the structure of 
coercive control, which is similarly morally offensive but equally 
difficult to translate into propositions of accepted criminal harm. Like 
blackmail, coercive control is, naturally, part coercion. But to the 
 
 332. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 333. Stephen Galoob, Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong with Blackmail, 22 LEGAL 
THEORY 22, 22 (2016). 
 334. Id. at 34. 
 335. Id. at 35 (citation omitted). 
 336. Id. at 36–37. 
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extent that it contains an agreement—“If you don’t do X, I will do Y, 
or I will withhold Z”—it is just as fraudulent as the blackmailer’s 
threat. In both cases—due, in one, to the unenforceability of the 
blackmailer’s agreement and, in the other, to the ongoing, repetitive 
pattern of behavior necessary to prove coercive control—the victim 
receives nothing of value in return. The blackmailer can continue to 
extort money because his victim has no legal recourse. And the 
domestic abuser can continue to extract obedience, because—until the 
moment he threatens physical violence—neither does his. 
With those starting principles as a foundation, the basic model 
offense is as follows: 
A person is guilty of the crime of coercive control when they: 
a) Continuously engage in a coercive pattern of behavior over a 
substantial period of time with the intent to deprive another 
person of their autonomy to make decisions and engage in 
conduct to which they otherwise have the right; and  
b) The two parties are spouses, intimate partners, or family 
members; and 
c) The pattern of behavior causes or creates a risk of nontrivial 
economic, physical, mental, or emotional harm to the coerced 
party. 
The remainder of this Section will work through each of the 
elements of this proposed offense to demonstrate how they use lessons 
from other criminal offenses to resolve many of the problems of 
legality and administrability identified in Part II of this Article as posed 
by the U.K. statute. 
1. “Continuously engage in a pattern of coercive behavior over a 
substantial period of time.”  The element of a “pattern of behavior” is 
intentionally broad in order to capture the essence of coercive 
control—and of domestic abuse generally—which is not 
“transactional.”337 The U.K. commentators argued, as the motivating 
policy behind the offense, that the core of domestic abuse is the 
perpetrator’s “micro-regulation” of a victim’s day-to-day affairs, with 
the ultimate goal of fully controlling them.338 This abuse may take the 
 
 337. See Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 9; Tuerkheimer, supra note 48, at 959–60. 
 338. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 48, at 963–65 & nn.3–7.  
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form of words, actions, financial decisions, or a wide range of other 
conduct it would be overly limiting to attempt to enumerate, 
particularly given the context-specific importance of any individual 
example of coercive behavior.339 Although the wording of this element 
is open to criticism for being overly expansive, it is no less so than the 
well-acknowledged “know-it-when-I-see-it” quality of fraud, remarked 
upon above.340 Like fraud, coercive control must remain a flexible 
enough concept to allow fact-finders to fit the law to complicated, 
unforeseeable fact patterns. In both cases, the goal is for fact-finders to 
determine whether one private party’s course of conduct toward 
another crosses the line that separates the immoral from the criminal. 
To avoid the potential for abuse, however, the proposed language 
shares and exceeds the U.K. statute’s requirement that the coercive 
behavior be ongoing, adding that it must occur over a “substantial 
period of time.” Like the U.K. version, the offense attempts to avoid 
punishing just any sort of technically coercive behavior within a 
relationship, which could include the strategies of persuasion two 
people with differing preferences engage in throughout the course of a 
typical intimate relationship. The requirements of continuity and 
longevity aim to target the sort of coercive conduct that fits a particular 
sociological pattern: coercion that rises to the level of systematic abuse. 
Criminalizing only such ongoing patterns of conduct—even where 
individual instances within the pattern may be, in and of themselves, 
perfectly legal—can be justified for the same reasons conspiracy law 
justifies criminalizing verbal agreements to do things it is perfectly legal 
to think about. If external agreement makes a “thought crime” both 
more dangerous and easier to prove without violating due process, the 
same can be said about an ongoing pattern of individually legal actions 
geared toward the improper goal of depriving another person of 
autonomy. The pattern, like the agreement, creates the danger—in the 
case of coercive control, the danger is the well-documented risk of 
repeated nonphysical coercion turning into physical, indeed lethal, 
violence. 
Further, this language addresses the somewhat limited case law on 
emotional distress–based stalking offenses. In striking down portions 
of their states’ stalking statutes, Illinois and Minnesota courts, at least, 
have suggested that a coercion offense lacking an element of physical 
 
 339. Id. at 964–65. 
 340. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941). 
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threat may raise constitutional overbreadth concerns.341 Unlike the 
problematic Illinois stalking statute, which would criminalize 
“knowingly threatening” someone two or more times when one should 
know it would cause emotional distress, this model coercive control 
offense requires a more frequent and lengthy series of behaviors. 
Indeed, much like the stalking statute the Colorado Supreme Court 
upheld, which also prohibited distressing “repeated” contact, an 
offense prohibiting a lengthy pattern of behavior does not criminalize 
“innocuous behavior,”342 particularly when combined with the other 
elements of the offense. 
2. “With the intent to deprive another person of their autonomy to 
make decisions and engage in conduct to which they otherwise have the 
right.”  The specific intent element of the model offense is its sharpest 
departure from the U.K. version—and also from existing state stalking 
statutes and the proposal by Ortiz to make coercive control a form of 
false imprisonment.343 All of those models criminalize intentional 
conduct that recklessly or negligently creates a particular response in 
the victim.344 This feature prevents defendants from arguing they were 
unaware of the fact that their behavior made their victim feel 
threatened, emotionally distressed, coerced, etc. Nonetheless, it is in 
this lack of specific intent to bring about the state of coercion that 
makes the U.K. coercive control offense difficult to defend against free 
speech objections. 
Due to the fraud-like aspects of coercive control, the law of fraud 
may help narrow the scope of behavior, including communications, 
that may properly be criminalized. As discussed in Part III.E, a 
hallmark component of fraud is scienter. Not all misrepresentations 
qualify as criminal, but the specific intent to defraud a victim brings 
deceptive conduct into the ambit of the criminal law. Therefore, a 
coercive control offense must include a specific intent element 
analogous to scienter in fraud. The perpetrator must have the purpose 
of using coercive behavior to extract unearned obedience from his 
victim in exchange for nothing but more threats.  
In addition to the legality problems the inclusion of a specific 
intent element resolves, there is good reason to believe it will also 
 
 341. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 342. People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 78 (Colo. 2006) (en banc). 
 343. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 344. See supra Part III.B–C. 
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resolve some of the problems of administrability likely to result from 
the open texture of the “pattern of behavior” actus reus element. Buell 
finds that courts deal with potentially open-ended fraud offenses by 
allowing cases to proceed against defendants who demonstrate a 
“consciousness of guilt” that their behavior runs afoul of prevailing 
legal norms rejecting such behavior. For a coercive control offense to 
effectively sort the clearly criminal cases of abuse from the ambiguous 
ones, it must contain an element that allows courts and fact-finders to 
weigh evidence of such “consciousness” on the side of conviction. 
Without such an element the offense risks encouraging prosecutorial 
exploitation. 
3. “[S]pouses, intimate partners or family members.”  This list of 
potential victims is by no means exhaustive. The model offense 
includes particular categories of victim to avoid some of the problems 
that have arisen from the fact that Congress failed to specify which 
sorts of service relationships gave rise to an “honest services fraud” 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The list is intended to capture the 
relationships most likely to create the risk of a permanent power 
imbalance between intimate parties, but arguments could conceivably 
be made for expanding or narrowing it. The role of coercive control in 
human trafficking, for example, opens a whole new avenue of 
inquiry.345 
4. “Risk of nontrivial economic, physical, mental, or emotional 
harm to the coerced party.”  The model offense intentionally 
incorporates an element equivalent to the “majority rule” in private-
sector honest services fraud, which requires at least an objective risk of 
reasonably foreseeable harm to the defrauded party. In adopting the 
foreseeable harm standard in honest services fraud cases, the D.C. 
Circuit noted that “the broadening of the scope of the statute to cover 
intangible harms” urged that attention be paid to the outer limits of the 
offense.346 Because many of the harms of coercive control are similarly 
“intangible,” it is consistent with this precedent to incorporate the 
more rigorous harm standard from the federal case law. Unlike in 
honest services fraud cases, of course, the relevant risked harm will 
only sometimes be economic, so the model statute also expands the list 
 
 345. See, e.g., Susie B. Baldwin, Anne E. Fehrenbacher & David P. Eisenman, Psychological 
Coercion in Human Trafficking: An Application of Biderman’s Framework, 25 QUALITATIVE 
HEALTH RES. 1171, 1177 (2015). 
 346. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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of cognizable potential harms to include all of those developed in the 
sociological literature on coercive control. However, by not requiring 
proof of injury-in-fact, the model statute focuses on abuser misconduct 
rather than on forcing vulnerable victims to convince the fact-finder of 
their victimization. Furthermore, the requirement that the threatened 
harm be nontrivial serves to address the potential overbreadth 
problems posed by inclusion of “intangible” harms. Such a limitation 
excludes cases of mere annoyance and irritation and requires the fact-
finder to determine whether the nature of the coercive conduct poses 
genuine psychological risk to the victim. In a world in which the justice 
system is, if anything, overly punitive, the criminal law should only 
expand to address nontrivial harms and evils.347 
B. Policy Considerations 
The model offense described above provides a theoretical basis 
for criminalizing coercive control consistent with existing principles 
that pass constitutional scrutiny in other areas of the criminal law. The 
fact that a state could create this offense, however, does not of course 
mean that it should. Simply limiting the offense in the manner this 
Article proposes addresses some of the most obvious policy objections 
to the U.K. version. The heightened mens rea requirement helps limit 
the number of cases in which the offense can be said to occur, thereby 
reducing the prospect of prosecutorial abuse and opportunism on the 
part of would-be victims. At the same time, the shift in focus to abuser 
conduct and risked harm, rather than injury-in-fact, will remove some 
impediments to proving genuine cases of abuse. 
Even with these improvements, any attempt to criminalize 
behavior that arises in intimate settings runs the risk of creating 
incentives for personal grievances to turn into criminal prosecutions. 
Yet critics once made the same arguments about the criminal 
prosecution of domestic assault348 and even “date” rape.349 The 
experience in those areas warns that it is simply not a valid blanket 
objection to punishing the serious abuse of an intimate partner to state 
that angry wives and lovers could gain traction in their private disputes 
by abusing the criminal law. That said, such a risk is necessarily 
 
 347. See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
65–66 (2008). 
 348. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 21, at 332. 
 349. See generally Richard S. Orton, Date Rape: Critiquing the Critics, 31 J. SEX RES. 148 
(1994) (discussing critiques of date rape prosecutions). 
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uniquely high in the coercive control context, which seeks to punish 
conduct that is not necessarily violent and at least sometimes ineffable. 
This is, therefore, a real set of concerns any legislature should weigh 
and measure against the equally real physical, psychological, and 
economic harms the conduct causes its victims. 
Another extremely important objection to criminalizing coercive 
control relates less to its potentially unfair effect on defendants and 
more to its potentially harmful effect on victims. Some feminist 
scholars suggest that the effort to affix the label of criminality to sexual 
and interpersonal encounters risks causing more and more women to 
perceive themselves as victims where they would not otherwise have 
done so had the law not intervened.350 For example, Professor Aya 
Gruber criticizes the feminist critique of so-called “rape culture” for 
formalizing a “trauma narrative” of rape in the context of campus 
sex.351 The trauma narrative is “rife with other risks, including 
bureaucratic management of students stripped of their subjectivity and 
speech restrictions” and “construes sexual assault complainants as 
devastated (or self-deluding) and female students as incapable of self-
management.”352 In short, she fears, “anti-rape culture repackages 
feminist energy and female empowerment as sexual victimhood.”353  
It is very easy to see how this risk might be even greater in cases 
of nonviolent coercive control than in sexual assault, which at least 
necessarily involves a physical act. Legislatures would need to balance 
very carefully the risk of inscribing a narrative of official victimization 
on any person whose partner engages in unpleasant behavior against 
the risk of preventing the behavior at the point it crosses the line into 
abuse. It is worth noting, however, that because my proposed statute 
focuses on abuser misconduct rather than victim injury, it is less likely 
to impose dignitary costs on victims by overemphasizing victim 
narratives. 
The most important objection to criminalizing coercive control is 
the argument against expanding criminal law in any way: it opens the 
door to overreaching and abuse in a way that would disproportionately 
affect communities that already experience the harms of excessive 
policing. The brutal shooting of twenty-six-year-old Louisville woman 
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Breonna Taylor by a police officer executing a misdirected search 
warrant in her apartment is only one recent high-profile example of the 
dangers of licensing police incursion into the home.354 Indeed, a new 
body of literature argues against achieving feminist goals through 
criminalization, suggesting that exacerbating the punitiveness of the 
criminal law will, among other ill effects, disproportionately affect 
Black and other minority communities.355 Particularly relevant to the 
heavily gendered case of domestic abuse, recent cultural commentary 
argues that the trope of violated femininity has, throughout history, 
been a weapon to justify police violence against Black men.356 Indeed, 
many domestic violence activists fear that criminalizing coercive 
control would exacerbate domestic violence because “[t]he legal 
system is not something people always view as helpful to them, and that 
can be related to an individual’s class and race and ethnicity and 
immigration status.”357 The counterpoint to some of these concerns is 
that the harms of domestic violence are, themselves, 
disproportionately felt by women of color.358 Regardless of the 
identities of the victims or the perpetrators, the project of criminalizing 
coercive control should not occur in a vacuum, but only against a 
backdrop of police reform geared toward eliminating structural racism 
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in police decisionmaking around use of force. Even beyond the 
problems of structural racism, police departments should receive 
training—as their counterparts in the United Kingdom have begun 
to359—on de-escalation in the unique context of domestic violence. 
Some promising examples already exist in the United States. Police 
departments in Dallas and Houston have begun to deploy social 
workers with police officers on certain calls.360 Camden, New Jersey 
entirely reconstructed its police department along the principle that an 
officer should no longer be the “arbitrary decider of what’s right and 
wrong,” but “a facilitator and a convener.”361  
Finally, legislatures would need to think about how the creation of 
a domestic fraud-based coercive control offense would interact with 
the affirmative defense of provocation. After all, the legal context of 
the Sally Challen case, currently so important to the recent state of the 
United Kingdom’s legal discourse on the subject, related to whether 
the victim of coercive control should have some sort of duress defense 
that would bump the killing of her controller down to manslaughter 
from murder. If coercive control itself became a criminal offense, 
would that qualify it as a source of “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse”?362 
The provocation doctrine, particularly the Model Penal Code’s broad 
formulation, has been criticized for intrinsic sexism, to the extent that 
it appears to partially excuse the rage-based killings often associated 
with male violence.363 Should the law come to recognize coercive 
control as a basis for provocation, it would seem to restore some 
symmetry to that beleaguered doctrine, though perhaps at the risk of 
encouraging violent self-help. These questions provide new directions 
for future research. 
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CONCLUSION  
This Article has advanced two claims, one explicit and one 
implicit. At the blackletter level, it has presented a model for thinking 
about coercive control using the doctrinal tools of criminal fraud and 
other offenses. The statutory solution proposed here is far from 
perfect, in part because any attempt to criminalize harmful conduct as 
wide-ranging and open to prosecutorial interpretation as coercive 
control is going to sit in tension with the basic rule of law. However, 
the proposed model statute has the advantage of harmony with other 
long-standing legal doctrines, as opposed to creating a brand-new, 
open-ended crime from whole cloth. This is particularly important as 
other “newer” statutory offenses, such as emotional child or elder 
abuse, stalking, and cyberbullying, continue to face due process 
objections, in addition to enforcement challenges. 
As a few states have begun to show interest in criminalizing 
coercive control, this exercise also demonstrates that legal reformers 
who seek to use society’s increased understanding of the sociological 
reality of gender-based harm may be better served not to create 
specialized offenses to address it. Although the criminal law may be a 
blunt tool for dealing with such complex problems as coercive control, 
using existing doctrines not only assures constitutionality—it prevents 
public perception of the offense as something less than a true crime. 
Conversely, a legal system that already punishes harmful immoral 
coercion in commercial settings through offenses like fraud would be 
more internally consistent if it accounted for equally harmful coercion 
in domestic settings. Integrating these bodies of law strengthens the 
legal foundations of both. 
 
